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Comments
The Legislative-Adjudicative Distinction in California
Land Use Regulation: A Suggested Response to
Arnel Development Co. v. City of Costa Mesa
Over fifty years have passed since the United States Supreme
Court ruled that land use regulation is a constitutional exercise of the
police power1 and accorded zoning legislation a presumption of valid-
ity.2 The Court, however, has never defined the term "legislation" in
the land use regulatory context.3 Therefore, the states have been left to
formulate their own rules to delineate the scope of regulatory actions
that are "legislative," as opposed to those that are "adjudicative,"'4 in
nature. The determination that an action is legislative not only at-
taches to the act a presumption of validity5 but also insulates it from
the constitutional due process requirements of notice and hearing to
affected parties6 and allows a direct vote by the electorate on the issue.
7
1. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). Land use ordinances
are not unconstitutional unless they are "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no sub-
stantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare." Id at 395. The
California Supreme Court reached the same conclusion a year earlier. See Miller v. Board
of Pub. Works, 195 Cal. 477, 234 P. 381 (1925).
2. "If the validity of the legislative classification for zoning purposes be fairly debata-
ble, the legislative judgment must be allowed to control." Euclid, 272 U.S. at 388. The
California Supreme Court also accorded a strong presumption of validity to zoning meas-
ures, stating that "[elvery intendment is to be indulged by the courts in favor of the validity
of [the police power's] exercise .. " Miller, 195 Cal. at 490, 234 P. at 385. This standard
of review is discussed infra in notes 143-50 & accompanying text.
3. The Court has decided few zoning cases since its broad pronouncement in Euclid
on the validity of zoning. See 1 R. ANDERSON, AMERicAN LAW OF ZONING § 3.10 (2d ed.
1976). Although the Court's decision in City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., 426 U.S. 668
(1976), has been interpreted by the California Supreme Court to sanction the use of the
technical label of a regulatory modification to determine whether an action is "legislative,"
"administrative" or 'Judicial," see Arnel Dev. Co. v. City of Costa Mesa, 28 Cal. 3d 511,
519-21, 620 P.2d 565, 570-71, 169 Cal. Rptr. 904, 909-10 (1980), theEasilake decision did not
address this issue. See infra notes 179-82 & accompanying text.
4. For definitions of "legislative" and "adjudicative," see infra notes 72-81 & accom-
panying text. Although governmental actions may be characterized by various other terms,
such as "administrative" or "quasi-judicial," the single distinction made in this Comment is
between legislative and nonlegislative actions. The latter category includes "adjudicative,"
"administrative," and "quasi-judicial," and these terms will be used interchangeably.
5. See supra note 2 & accompanying text.
6. Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915); San Diego
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Most states rely upon an action's label8 or upon the character of
the governmental body that is acting to determine whether the action is
legislative or adjudicative.9 However, some states have abandoned
strict reliance on labels in favor of definitional approaches that allow
greater judicial scrutiny of local "legislative" decisions' ° or that prevent
land use decisions from being made by the electorate directly." Cali-
fornia appeared to be following this trend.' 2 Then, in Arnel Develop-
ment Co. v. City of Costa Mesa, 13 the California Supreme Court ruled
that the label of a land use regulatory change determines whether it is
legislative in character.'
4
This Comment examines the effect of the Arnel decision on land
use regulation in California and suggests modifying the regulatory sys-
tem to alleviate problems perpetuated by the decision. The first section
describes California's statutory framework of land use regulation and
explains the relationship between zoning legislation and zoning admin-
istration within that system. The second section surveys California
case law prior toArnel to determine the impact of constitutional law on
the zoning system. Then the Arnel decision is examined in order to
complete the broad picture of land use regulatory procedures in Cali-
fornia today. The final section proposes statutory modifications to the
Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. City Council, 13 Cal. 3d 205, 529 P.2d 570, 118 Cal. Rptr. 146
(1974); see Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975). See infra notes 37-38, 110 & accompany-
ing text.
7. City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., 426 U.S. 668 (1976); San Diego Bldg. Con-
tractors Ass'n v. City Council, 13 Cal. 3d 205, 529 P.2d 570, 118 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1974). See
infra notes 111-13 & accompanying text. For further discussion of the procedural ramifica-
tions of the legislative-adjudicative distinction, see infra notes 119-50 & accompanying text.
8. The term "label" refers to the technical name attached to governmental action de-
pending upon the means by which the action is effected. In some situations, for example, a
particular activity may be allowed in an area either by amending the applicable land use
ordinance or by granting a conditional use permit. Although the immediate result is the
same (the activity is permitted), the former action is labeled rezoning, whereas the latter is
labeled an issuance of a permit.
9. Kahn, In Accordance with a Constitutional Plan: Procedural Due Process and Zon-
ing Decisions, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1011, 1029 (1979). See I R. ANDERSON, supra note
3, § 3.14; Coon, The Initial Characterization of Land Use Decisions, 6 ENVTL. L. 121, 121 &
n.1 (1975).
10. See, e.g., Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264 Or. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973).
11. See, e.g., West v. City of Portage, 392 Mich. 458, 221 N.W.2d 303 (1974) (zoning
amendment was "administrative," so it could not be subject to referendum); Leonard v. City
of Bothell, 87 Wash. 2d 847, 557 P.2d 1306 (1976) (same).
12. ZONING AND PLANNING LAW HANDBOOK § 3.0212][a] (F. Strom ed. 1982); Note,
Arnel Development Co. v. City of Costa Mes=" Rezoning by Initiative and Landowners' Due
Process Rights, 70 CALIF. L. REv. 1107, 1115-17 (1982); see REAL PROP. L. REP. (CEB) 26-
27 (Mar. 1981). See infra notes 170-75 & accompanying text.
13. 28 Cal. 3d 511, 620 P.2d 565, 169 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1980).
14. Id See infra note 166 & accompanying text.
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regulatory system that would alleviate the consequences of California's
reliance on labels.
Statutory Framework
The California Constitution confers broad police powers on all cit-
ies and counties to regulate the uses of land within their jurisdictions. 15
In addition, the state legislature has imposed a duty on local govern-
ments to engage in planning' 6 and has restricted the manner in which
the duty can be met. 17 However, the legislature has declared that, in
general, its guidelines for zoning regulations should "provide only a
minimum of limitation in order that counties and cities may exercise
the maximum degree of control over local zoning."' 8
Land Use Legislation
The California Government Code mandates that the legislative
15. "A county or city may make and enforce within its limits all local, police, sanitary,
and other ordinances and regulations not in conflict with general laws." CAL. CONST. art.
XI, § 7. The California legislature reserves to counties and cities the power to regulate by
ordinance the use of buildings, structures, and land; to regulate signs and billboards; to
regulate location, height, bulk, number of stories and size of buildings and structures; to
regulate the size and use of lots and open spaces and the intensity of land use; to establish
requirements for offstreet parking and loading; to establish building setback lines; and to
create and regulate civic districts around civic centers. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65850 (West
Supp. 1981).
16. See infra notes 19-23 & accompanying text.
17. For example, cities and counties must develop and adopt a general plan for their
jurisdiction's physical development. See infra notes 19-21 & accompanying text. Further-
more, the legislature has prescribed that certain mandatory elements be included in the
plans, see infra note 22 & accompanying text, and has set deadlines for adopting these
mandatory elements. CAL. GovTr CODE §§ 65302.2-.6 (West Supp. 1981). Certain proce-
dures must also be followed in adopting and amending the plan. See infra notes 29-32 &
accompanying text. See generally CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 65300-65403 (West 1966 & Supp.
1981).
The California Constitution provides that the electorate of a city may adopt a charter to
govern the municipality. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 3. The charter supersedes state law unless
state law preempts the charter provisions, CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 5, and the state planning
and zoning laws therefore do not generally apply to cities that have adopted such charters,
CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 65700, 65803 (West 1966 & Supp. 1981). "Subject only to constitu-
tional limitations and preemptive state law, the charter [of a city] is the supreme law of the
state with respect to its municipal affairs." Bayless v. Limber, 26 Cal. App. 3d 463, 468, 102
Cal. Rptr. 647, 649 (1972). However, chartered cities are specifically required to adopt gen-
eral plans that contain the mandatory elements. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65700 (West Supp.
1981). Such cities are requ'ired by statute to meet certain minimum procedural requirements
for the conduct of their zoning hearings. Id § 65804. See infra note 29 & accompanying
text. See generally J. LONGTIN, CALIFORNIA LAND USE REGULATIONS §§ 2.02, 2.03 (1977).
A city that has not adopted a charter is a general law city, as it is governed by the
general laws of the state. Such a city may pass ordinances and regulations that do not con-
flict with general laws. CAL. CONsT. art. XI, § 7.
18. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65800 (West Supp. 1981).
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body of each county and city adopt a comprehensive, long-term gen-
eral plan for the jurisdiction's physical development.1 9 The legislative
body must also establish a planning agency 20 to develop and maintain
the general plan.21 There are nine particular topics, or "mandatory ele-
ments," that must be discussed in the plan,22 and numerous other ele-
ments that may be included.
23
The comprehensive plan determines, in a general sense, the sub-
stance of the jurisdiction's zoning ordinances, 24 because such ordi-
nances must be consistent with the plan.25 Except for this consistency
19. Id § 65300. The scope of the plan must also include "any land outside [the juris-
diction's] boundaries which in the planning agency's judgment bears relation to [the jurisdic-
tion's] planning." Id The Government Code also provides that the plan is to include a
statement of development policies along with diagrams setting forth objectives, principles,
standards, and plan proposals. Id § 65302. The general plan has been described as "a
constitution for all future developments within the city." O'Loane v. O'Rourke, 231 Cal.
App. 2d 774, 782, 42 Cal. Rptr. 283, 288 (1965). Unlike a constitution, however, it is "tenta-
tive and subject to change." Selby Realty Co. v. City of San Buenaventura, 10 Cal. 3d 110,
118, 514 P.2d 111, 116, 109 Cal. Rptr. 799, 804 (1973). See generally J. LONGTIN, supra note
17, § 1.20.
20. This agency can be the local legislative body itself. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65100
(West Supp. 1982).
21. Id. § 65101 (West 1966).
22. The nine elements are (1) land use, which designates the proposed general distribu-
tion and location and extent of land for housing, business, industry, open space, etc.; (2) cir-
culation, which consists of the general location and extent of existing and planned major
transportation thoroughfares, terminals, and other public utilities and facilities; (3) housing,
which is aimed at analyzing and providing for housing needs; (4) conservation, which con-
cerns the conservation, development and utilization of natural resources; (5) open space,
which is aimed at preserving open, unimproved lands; (6) seismic safety, to deal with effects
of seismically induced waves such as tsunamis and seiches; (7) noise, for the purpose of noise
ordinance development and enforcement; (8) scenic highways, to develop, establish, and
protect scenic highways; (9) safety, for protection from fires and geologic hazards. Id
§ 65302 (West Supp. 1981). See generall, J. LONGTIN, supra note 17, § 1.22.
23. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65303 (West Supp. 1981). The statute discusses other ele-
ments, including recreation, traffic, transportation, transit, public services and facilities, pub-
lic buildings, community design, substandard housing, redevelopment, and historical
preservation. See generally J. LONGTIN, supra note 17, § 1.23.
24. Zoning ordinances are local laws that actually describe and limit the activities and
structures that are allowed in the various areas of a jurisdiction. See CAL. GOV'T CODE
§§ 65850-65852 (West 1966 & Supp. 1981). See supra note 15. Zoning ordinances also es-
tablish the procedures and criteria for obtaining administrative permits. See CAL. Gov'T
CODE § 65901 (West Supp. 1981). For a general discussion of the distinction between plan-
ning and zoning, see O'Loane v. O'Rourke, 231 Cal. App. 2d 774, 780, 42 Cal. Rptr. 283, 286
(1965).
25. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65860 (West Supp. 1981). This statute provides that an ordi-
nance is consistent with the general plan only if "[tihe various land uses authorized by the
ordinance are compatible with the objectives, policies, general land uses, and programs spec-
ified in such a plan." Id § 65860(a)(ii). Few courts have considered whether an ordinance
is consistent with a general plan, and no clear analysis or approach to the issue has been
developed. See D. HAGMAN, J. LARSON, & C. MARTIN, CALIFORNIA ZONING PRACTICE
§ 2.29 (Supp. 1982). It is clear, however, that if no plan has been adopted, or if the existing
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requirement, local governments are fairly free to control the substance
of their land use regulations.26 Furthermore, if a zoning amendment is
inconsistent with the general plan, the plan can be amended concur-
rently to remove the inconsistency.
27
Although the substance of general plans and ordinances is deter-
mined almost exclusively by local governments,28 the procedures for
adopting or modifying plans and ordinances are established to a large
degree by the state legislature. 29 Before action to adopt or modify a
general plan or ordinance can be taken, the local legislative body must
hold at least one public hearing, notice of which is published no fewer
than ten days before the hearing. 30 If the jurisdiction has a planning
commission in addition to its legislative body, then that commission
must similarly give notice and hold a public hearing before making its
recommendations to the legislators.3' If the legislators disagree with
the commission's recommendations, any proposed changes not already
considered by the commission must be referred back to the commission
plan is inadequate, then the consistency requirement cannot be met. Camp v. Mendocino
County Bd. of Supervisors, 123 Cal. App. 3d 334, 176 Cal. Rptr. 620 (1981). In the absence
of a valid plan, the local government "'may not lawfully approve any subdivision or parcel
map or enact any zoning ordinance or issue any certificates of compliance or certificates of
approval."' Id at 352 & n.10, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 632 & n.10 (quoting with approval the trial
court's statement of the law); see also Save El Toro Ass'n v. Days, 74 Cal. App. 3d 64, 141
Cal. Rptr. 282 (1977) (absence of required open space plan precluded any action by city to
acquire, regulate or restrict open space land or approve subdivision map).
26. See supra notes 15-18 & accompanying text. Scattered throughout the California
Government Code are various restrictions on permitted zoning purposes and methods for
their achievement. See, e.g., § 65852 (West 1966) (requires regulations to be uniform within
any given zone), § 65852.3 (West Supp. 1981) (restricts prohibition of mobile homes).
27. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65862 (West Supp. 1981). The local legislative body may
amend a general plan when it deems such change to be in the public interest, id § 65356.1,
but none of the nine mandatory elements of a plan may be amended more than three times a
year. Id § 65361. See infra notes 29-32 & accompanying text for a discussion of the proce-
dures for adopting and amending general plans.
28. See supra notes 15, 18, 22-27 & accompanying text.
29. The procedures described in this section do not apply to a charter city unless
adopted in the charter or as an ordinance. See San Diego Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. City
Council, 13 Cal. 3d 205, 210 n.2, 529 P.2d 570, 572 n.2, 118 Cal. Rptr. 146, 148 n.2 (1974);
CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65803 (West 1966). See also supra note 17. The state legislature has
mandated some "minimum procedural standards for the conduct of city and county zoning
hearings!' which are applicable to charter cities. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65804 (West Supp.
1981). However, the guidelines it has established in § 65804 to apply to both charter and
general law cities are far less detailed than those that apply just to general law cities. See
infra notes 30-35 & accompanying text.
30. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 65355, 65358, 65856, 65861 (West 1966). Notice must be
published in a newspaper of general circulation in the city or county or, if there is no such
newspaper, notice must be posted in at least three public places in the city or county. Id
65351, 65355, 65854.
31. Id §§ 65351, 65854.
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for report and recommendation. 32
Further procedural prerequisites to actions on ordinances exist
that do not apply to actions on a general plan. In addition to notice by
publication, whenever an ordinance proposal or change is contem-
plated, notice must be mailed to all owners of property lying within
three hundred feet of the affected area.33 If the action is contested, a
record must be made of any hearing on the issue if anyone so requests
prior to the hearing. 34 However, both plans and ordinances can be
adopted or amended without any findings being made to support the
decision.
35
Any actions on plans or ordinances are considered legislative,36 so
they do not trigger the constitutional due process requirements of no-
tice and hearing.37 Because the procedures described above are man-
dated by statute, the notice and hearing that are provided pursuant to
that mandate need not meet constitutional standards;38 they need only
32. Id §§ 65356, 65857 (West Supp. 1981).
33. Id. § 65854.5. However, "[flailure to receive the notice required by [§ 65854.51
shall not invalidate the ordinance or amendment." Id
34. Id § 65804(b). Although the duty to make such a record is placed on the local
planning agency by subsection (b), the hearings that the agency must record appear to be all
zoning hearings, because subsection (b) is set out in the statute as one of the "procedures
[that] shall govern city and county zoning hearings." Id The California Supreme Court has
stated in dicta, however, that § 65804 applies only to those zoning hearings before local
planning agencies, not to all zoning hearings. San Diego B'dg. Contractors Ass'n, 13 Cal. 3d
at 210 n.2, 529 P.2d at 572 n.2, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 148 n.2.
35. There is no requirement in the planning or zoning laws that findings be made.
Furthermore, because action on both plans and ordinances is "legislative" in character, its
presumption of validity can be rebutted only if there is no rational basis that the legislators
may have had in mind when they passed it. Miller v. Board of Pub. Works, 195 Cal. 477,
490, 234 P. 381, 386 (1925). See supra notes 1-4 & accompanying text. Legislative action is
reviewable only by traditional mandamus pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure
§ 1085, and findings are not required under that section. Ensign Bickford Realty Co. v. City
Council, 68 Cal. App. 3d 467, 473, 137 Cal. Rptr. 304, 307 (1977). Administrative actions,
on the other hand, must be supported by findings. Topanga Ass'n for a Scenic Community
v. County of Los Angeles, 11 Cal. 3d 506, 522 P.2d 12, 113 Cal. Rptr. 836 (1974) (interpret-
ing the administrative mandamus provision, CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1094.5 (West 1980)).
For a discussion of the two forms of mandamus, see infra notes 130-50 & accompanying
text.
36. Arnel Dev. Co. v. City of Costa Mesa, 28 Cal. 3d 511, 620 P.2d 565, 169 Cal. Rptr.
904 (1980); Karlson v. City of Camarillo, 100 Cal. App. 3d 789, 161 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1980);
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65301.5 (West Supp. 1981).
37. Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915) ("Where
a rule of conduct applies to more than a few people it is impracticable that everyone should
have a direct voice in its adoption. . . . [The rights of affected parties] are protected the
only way that they can be in a complex society, by their power, immediate or remote, over
those who make the rule.").
38. "[A] hearing allowed by legislative grace is not circumscribed by the restrictions
applicable to judicial or quasi-judicial adversary proceedings." Franchise Tax Bd. v. Supe-
rior Court, 36 Cal. 2d 538, 549, 225 P.2d 905, 911 (1950). The doctrines surrounding the
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comply with the statute.
In California, the electorate has a constitutional right to adopt and
veto legislation.39 This right cannot be impeded by statutorily imposed
zoning procedures.40 Therefore, whenever plans or ordinances are
adopted or amended by the electorate by means of initiative or referen-
dum, the procedural requirements described above do not apply.41 Af-
fected parties have no right to notice or hearing. 42 The planning
commission,43 which is required to hold hearings and make recommen-
dations to the legislative body on proposed changes,44 and which pre-
phrase "notice and hearing" in its constitutional sense--the right to notice reasonably calcu-
lated to apprise one of the pendency of the action, Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 33 (1950); the right to be represented by counsel, Borror v. Department
of Inv., 15 Cal. App. 3d 531, 540, 92 Cal. Rptr. 525, 530 (1971); the right to present evidence
and rebut opposing evidence, Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. I (1938)-do not apply to
legislative hearings. "Generally speaking, a hearing on a legislative matter is held for the
purpose of informing the law makers regarding relevant facts and policy considerations; it is
not held for the protection of individual rights, property or otherwise." Bayless v. Limber,
26 Cal. App. 3d 463, 470, 102 Cal. Rptr. 647, 650 (1972).
39. The California Constitution provides that "[i]nitiative and referendum powers may
be exercised by the electors of each city or county under procedures that the Legislature
shall provide." CAL. CONST. art. II, § 11. Although this section explicitly leaves charter
cities unaffected, a city may provide such powers in its charter. CAL CONsT. art XI, § 5; see
San Diego Bldg. Contractors AssAn, 13 Cal. 3d at 208, 529 P.2d at 571, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 147.
The initiative process allows the electorate directly to enact legislation. A local initia-
tive is a proposed ordinance that is submitted to the local legislative body after a petition in
its support has been signed by at least 15% (the required number is different in smaller cities)
of the jurisdiction's registered voters. The legislative body may then adopt the ordinance, or
order a special election at which the proposed ordinance is submitted to a general vote. A
smaller number of petition signatures is required if the proponents seek only to have the
ordinance submitted to the voters at the next regular election. See CAL. ELEC. CODE § 4000-
4021 (West 1977 & Supp. 1982).
The local referendum process may be used to veto ordinances passed by the local legis-
lative body. If a petition protesting the adoption of an ordinance is signed by 10% of the
jurisdiction's registered voters (the percent is greater in smaller cities) and submitted to the
clerk of the legislative body within 30 days of the adoption of the ordinance, the effective
date of the ordinance is suspended, and the legislative body must reconsider the ordinance.
If the legislative body does not entirely repeal the ordinance, it must submit it to the voters
at a regular or special election. If a majority of the voters does not approve it, the ordinance
does not become effective, and it cannot be enacted by the legislative body for the period of
a year. See id §§ 4050-4061.
40. Associated Home Builders of the Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 18
Cal. 3d 582, 595, 557 P.2d 473, 480, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 48 (1976). See infra notes 117-18 &
accompanying text.
41. See Associated Home Builders, 18 Cal. 3d at 590-96, 557 P.2d at 476-81, 135 Cal.
Rptr. at 44-49.
42. See id at 596, 557 P.2d at 481, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 49.
43. The establishment of a planning commission is optional. See CAL. Gov'T CODE
§§ 65100(c), 65861 (West 1966 & Supp. 1981).
44. Id §§ 65351-65352, 65354, 65854-65855 (West 1966 & Supp. 1981). If the legisla-
tive body wants to modify the action that the planning commission recommended, it must
refer the proposed modification back to the commission for a report on the proposal. Id
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sumably has expertise in the area of local land use regulation and
planning, is bypassed when the electorate exercises its power to
legislate.
Although the statutory procedural requirements are inapplicable
to initiatives and referenda, the statutory substantive requirements re-
lating to plans and ordinances must be met even when the electorate
legislates directly. The general plan must meet the requirements estab-
lished by the legislature,45 and the zoning ordinances must be consis-
tent with the general plan.46 The people cannot adopt by initiative an




The state zoning laws48 provide for a system by which administra-
tive relief from the strict application of the zoning ordinances can be
granted.49 First, the statutes provide that the local legislative body may
create separate bodies to hear and decide administrative zoning mat-
ters,50 or it may leave these functions to the planning commission and
the local legislative body itself.5 ' Because the establishment of both the
administrative bodies and the planning commission is optional,52 the
local legislative body may handle all of the administrative responsibili-
ties as well as the legislative tasks. Second, the statutes prescribe vari-
§§ 65356, 65857. See generally J. LONGTIN, supra note 17, § 1.13. See supra notes 31-32 &
accompanying text.
45. Arnel, 28 Cal. 3d at 524, 620 P.2d at 573, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 912. The requirements
are discussed supra at notes 22-27 & accompanying text.
46. Arnel, 28 Cal. 3d at 524, 620 P.2d at 573, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 912. The consistency
requirement is discussed supra at notes 25 & 27 & accompanying text. Presumably, the
electorate could vote to amend the general plan concurrently to avoid any inconsistency
problem. See CAL. Gov'r CODE § 65862 (West Supp. 1981).
47. Bagley v. City of Manhattan Beach, 18 Cal. 3d 22, 26-27, 553 P.2d 1140, 1143, 132
Cal. Rptr. 668, 671 (1976); Arnel Dev. Co. v. City of Costa Mesa, 126 Cal. App. 3d 330, 337,
178 Cal. Rptr. 723, 727 (1981) (on remand from the California Supreme Court).
48. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 65800-65912 (West 1966 & Supp. 1981).
49. See id §§ 65900-65909.5. These provisions do not apply to charter cities. See
supra note 17.
50. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 65900-65901 (West 1966 & Supp. 1981). Section 65900 refers
to these separate administrative bodies as a "board of zoning adjustment," an "office of
zoning administrator," and a "board of appeals." The first two bodies hear and decide ap-
plications for conditional use and other permits, as well as variances. Id § 65901 (West
Supp. 1981). See infra notes 53-55 & accompanying text. The function of the board of
appeals is to hear and determine appeals from the first two bodies. Id § 65903 (West 1966).
51. If neither a board of adjustment nor an office of zoning administrator has been
created, the planning commission is to exercise the functions of these bodies. Id § 65902
(West Supp. 1981). If a board of appeals has not been created, the local legislative body is to
exercise its functions and duties. Id. § 65904 (West 1966). See supra note 50.
52. See supra notes 43 & 51.
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ous prerequisites to the granting of variances 53 and conditional use
permits,54 the two major forms of administrative relief from zoning
ordinances. 55
While the California Government Code restricts the conditions
under which a variance may be granted,5 6 it leaves it to the local legis-
lative body to establish by ordinance the criteria for granting condi-
tional use permits.57 These criteria may be as vague as a "general
welfare" standard.58 Neither variances nor conditional use permits are
53. A variance is an exception from the strict application of the zoning ordinance and
is granted when, because of the special circumstances of a piece of property, such applica-
tion would deprive the property of privileges enjoyed by other property within the same
zone. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65906 (West Supp. 1981). In Zakessian v. City of Sausalito, 28
Cal. App. 3d 794, 105 Cal. Rptr. 105 (1972), for example, where most of a lot was submerged
in salt marsh and tidelands, the owner was entitled to a variance from the strict application
of a citywide requirement that offstreet parking be provided. The owner had a lease on a
nearby parking lot, but the lease was not permanent, so it did not satisfy the requirement.
Had the variance not been granted, the owner would have had to fill in part of the bay for
parking before he could have used his building, which rested on pilings in the water, as a
restaurant.
A variance serves to place the property on an equal basis with neighboring properties
but may not be used to grant special privileges inconsistent with the limitations on other
properties in the vicinity or to allow a use not otherwise allowed in the zone. CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 65906 (West Supp. 1981). See infra notes 61-62 & accompanying text. See generally
D. HAoMAN, J. LARSON & C. MARTIN, supra note 25, §§ 7.21-.51 (1969 & Supp. 1982).
54. A conditional use permit is an exception to the zoning ordinance for a use that is
not generally allowed in the zone but that will promote the general welfare without impair-
ing the character of the district. See Upton v. Gray, 269 Cal. App. 2d 352, 357, 74 Cal. Rptr.
783, 786 (1969). See generally CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65901 (West Supp. 1981); J. LONGTIN,
supra note 17, § 2.112; 5 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW § 484 (8th ed. 1974).
The degree of departure allowable from the generally permitted uses through a condi-
tional use permit depends on the local ordinance that prescribes the criteria to be met before
a permit can be issued. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65901 (West Supp. 1981). The ordinance
may provide the single requirement that the proposed activity be in the general welfare.
Hawkins v. County of Main, 54 Cal. App. 3d 586, 591-92, 126 Cal. Rptr. 754, 758 (1976)
(alternative holding); Van Sicklen v. Browne, 15 Cal. App. 3d 122, 127, 92 Cal. Rptr. 786,
789 (1971); Stoddard v. Edelman, 4 Cal. App. 3d, 544, 548-49, 84 Cal. Rptr. 443, 445 (1970);
cf City and County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 2d 236, 250, 347 P.2d 294,
303, 1 Cal. Rptr. 158, 167 (1959) (general welfare standard gives adequate guidance in pass-
ing on building permit applications). Some examples of liberal conditional use permits in-
clude a permit to build an apartment complex in an R-1 (single-family residential) zone,
Case v. City of Los Angeles, 218 Cal. App. 2d 36, 32 Cal. Rptr. 271 (1963), and a permit to
excavate for commercial production of rock, sand and gravel on 105 acres in a residential
area, Wheeler v. Gregg, 90 Cal. App. 2d 348, 203 P.2d 37 (1949).
55. These prerequisites also apply to other administrative permits, such as building and
grading permits. The statutory procedures discussed with regard to conditional use permits
and variances are generally applicable to these other permits. See, e.g., CAL. GOVT CODE
§ 65905 (West 1966). The criteria for determining the availability of permits is left to the
local legislative body to establish by ordinance. Id § 65901 (West Supp. 1981).
56. Id § 65906 (West Supp. 1981). See supra note 53.
57. CAL. GOv'T CODE § 65901 (West Supp. 1981).
58. See supra note 54.
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explicitly required to be consistent with the general plan.5 9 At least one
court has stated that there is no implicit requirement that conditional
use permits be consistent with the general plan.60 Although a variance
cannot authorize a use not expressly permitted by the applicable zoning
ordinance,6' it can allow structures to be built that do not conform to
the general plan.
62
A variance application may be ruled on without a hearing, 63 but
all other permit applications require a public hearing after notice is
given by mail or by publication and posting on the property.64 Regard-
less of whether the local variance ordinance requires a hearing, notice
of proposed variances must be mailed or delivered to all owners of
property within three hundred feet of the subject property.
65
Because actions on permit applications are administrative, 66 they
cannot be decided or vetoed by initiative or referendum.67 Therefore,
the notice and hearing procedures are never bypassed, unlike the pro-
cedures accompanying legislative decisions, which are bypassed when
the electorate makes the legislative decision.68
59. Government Code § 65860 requires only that zoning ordinances be consistent with
general plans. See supra note 25. It makes no mention of variances or permits. CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 65860 (West Supp. 1981).
60. Hawkins v. County of Marin, 54 Cal. App. 3d 586, 594, 126 Cal. Rptr. 754, 760
(1976) (alternative holding). In Hawkins, the conditional use permit allowed the construc-
tion of 102 units of housing, including a 26-unit building, in an area zoned for single-family
dwellings.
61. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65906 (West Supp. 1981). Uses authorized by ordinances must
be consistent with the general plan. See supra note 25 & accompanying text. Uses author-
ized by a variance must also be consistent with the general plan, since a variance cannot
allow a use not otherwise allowed in the zone. See supra note 53.
62. The California Government Code does not require variances to be consistent with
the general plan. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65906 (West Supp. 1981). See supra note 59.
However, many cities and counties require that variances be in harmony with the general
plan. J. LONGTIN, supra note 17, § 2.111(7].
63. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65901 (West Supp. 1981). The ordinance that provides for
variance decisions to be made without a public hearing must "specify the kinds of variances
which may be granted by the zoning administrator, and the extent of variation which the
zoning administrator may allow." Id If a variance may affect a significant property inter-
est, however, notice and hearing will be constitutionally required. See infra notes 123-29 &
accompanying text.
64. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65905 (West 1966). Notice and hearing requirements may be
more stringent when a permit affects a significant property interest. See infra notes 123-29 &
accompanying text.
65. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65901 (West Supp. 1981). It has been suggested that the pur-
pose of this notice requirement, when no hearing is required, is to allow property owners in
the area to appeal the administrator's decision. Review of Selected 1979 California Legisla-
tion, 11 PAC. L.J. 259, 620 (1979).
66. SeeArnel, 28 Cal. 3d at 518 n.8, 620 P.2d at 569 n.8, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 908 n.8.
67. Simpson v. Hite, 36 Cal. 2d 125, 129, 222 P.2d 225, 228 (1950); Lincoln Property
Co. No. 41 v. Law, 45 Cal. App. 3d 230, 234, 119 Cal. Rptr. 292, 294 (1975).
68. See supra notes 39-41 & accompanying text.
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Comparison of Legislative and Administrative Systems
The legislative and administrative regulatory systems are not
merely alternative or redundant means to control the use of land. The
legislative system operates to establish rules that apply equally to all
land within a given zone.69 By virtue of their broad application, these
rules reflect and implement general policy.70 Conversely, the adminis-
trative system is the means by which the government responds to par-
ticular situations. Permits are issued only in response to an application
for relief by some particular party;7' there is no provision for the sua
sponte issuance of administrative relief.
The California Supreme Court has recognized this basic difference
in the character and the purposes of the two regulatory systems. The
court addressed the distinguishing characteristics of the two systems in
San Diego Building Contractors Association v. City Council,72 in which
it characterized the zoning ordinance in question as "legislation of the
classic mold, establishing a broad, generally applicable rule of conduct
on the basis of a general public policy. '73 The court distinguished the
enactment of an ordinance from adjudicative decisionmaking, "in
which the government's action. . . was determined by facts peculiar to
the individual case." 74 In the "adjudicative" category, the court placed
"'administrative' zoning decisions, such as the grant of a variance or
69. "All [zoning] regulations shall be uniform for each class or kind of building or use
of land throughout each zone .... " CAL. GOVT CODE § 65852 (West 1966). Although
exceptions to the uniform application of zoning ordinances are granted, such exceptions are
uniformly available to all. That is, the ordinances which provide for the granting of admin-
istrative relief must themselves be uniform. See id § 65901 (West Supp. 1981) (permits are
available only "when the zoning ordinance provides therefor and establishes criteria for
determining such matters. . .).
The statutes do not limit how small the zones can be, see id § 65851 (West 1966) ("the
legislative body may divide [its jurisdiction] ... into zones of the number, shape and area it
deems best suited to carry out the purpose of this chapter"), so it might be argued that the
uniformity requirement could be defeated by simply creating a new zone whenever different
treatment within a given zone was desired. However, this potential practice is curtailed by
the requirements that zoning ordinances not be arbitrary and have a substantial relation to
the public welfare. See supra note 1. In addition, if the new zone is quite small, the rezon-
ing may be attacked as not only arbitrary, but also discriminatory. "The principle limiting
judicial inquiry into the legislative body's police power objectives does not bar scrutiny of a
quite different issue, that of discrimination against a particular parcel of property." G & D
Holland Constr. Co. v. City of Marysville, 12 Cal. App. 3d 989, 994, 91 Cal. Rptr. 227, 230
(1970).
70. The requirement that zoning ordinances be consistent with the general plan acts to
ensure that they reflect general policy. See supra note 25 & accompanying text.
71. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65901 (West Supp. 1981).
72. 13 Cal. 3d 205, 529 P.2d 570, 118 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1974).
73. Id. at 213, 529 P.2d at 574, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 150. The ordinance imposed a 30-foot
height limit on all buildings within San Diego's coastal zone, from the northern limit of the
city to the Mexican border. Id at 208 n.1, 529 P.2d at 571 n.1, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 147 n.l.
74. Id at 212, 529 P.2d at 574, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 150.
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the award of a conditional use permit. .... ,,75
The court also recognized the different purposes of the two systems
in Topanga Association for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Ange-
les.76 The court noted that variances permit flexibility when a compre-
hensive zoning plan affects owners of some parcels unfairly. 7 After
invalidating a variance on procedural grounds, 78 the court remarked in
dictum that by granting variances involving large79 tracts of land, "a
variance board begins radically to alter the nature of the entire zone.
Such change is a proper subject for legislation, not piecemeal adminis-
trative adjudication.
'80
Although the legislative creation of land use policy and the admin-
istrative application of that policy can be readily distinguished both
statutorily and conceptually,81 they cannot so easily be distinguished in
practice. Many substantive changes in land use restrictions can be ef-
fected through either system. For example, a landowner who wants to
develop his or her land for a use not allowed by the applicable zoning
ordinance can apply for a variance if the parcel can be somehow distin-
guished from the surrounding property in the zone as suffering a
unique hardship.82 A conditional use permit may be available if the
owner shows that the proposed use would promote the general welfare
of the area.83 Finally, the zoning ordinance can be amended to allow
75. Id.
76. 11 Cal. 3d 506, 522 P.2d 12, 113 Cal. Rptr. 836 (1974).
77. Id at 511, 522 P.2d at 14, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 838.
78. The court found that the administrative mandamus provision, CAL. CiV. PROC.
CODE § 1094.5 (West 1980), implicitly requires that findings be made to support administra-
tive decisions. 11 Cal. 3d at 514-15, 522 P.2d at 17, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 841. Topanga and the
administrative mandamus provision are discussed infra at notes 130-42 & accompanying
text.
79. The variance applied to 28 acres. 11 Cal. 3d at 522, 522 P.2d at 22, 113 Cal. Rptr.
at 846.
80. Id-
81. Many courts and commentators have addressed the conceptual distinction between
legislative and adjudicative acts. In addition to the differences noted by the California
Supreme Court, see supra notes 72-80 & accompanying text, it has been suggested that "leg-
islative action is that which defines or alters private rights. . . .Judicial action is that which
relates to the adjudication of rights. By adjudication is meant the determination of the ex-
tent of pre-existing legislatively recognized rights." Huffman & Plantico, Towarda Theory of
Land Use Planning: Lessonsfroram Oregon, 14 LAND & WATER L. REv. 1, 59-60 (1979). See
generally Depelopments in the Law--Zoning, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1427, 1508-13 (1978); Com-
ment, Zoning Amendments-The Product of Judicial or Quasi-Judicial Action, 33 OHIO ST.
L.J. 130, 134-36 (1972).
82. See supra note 53 & accompanying text. In Topanga, 11 Cal. 3d 506, 522 P.2d 12,
113 Cal. Rptr. 836 (1974), the court held that a mere showing that a particular parcel was
unsuitable for its zoned use would not support the granting of a variance. Id at 521, 522
P.2d at 21, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
83. See, e.g., supra note 54. See generally D. HAGMAN, J. LARSON, & C. MARTIN,
supra note 25, § 7.14.
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the proposed use.84
The electorate can legislatively block virtually all of these
changes. 5 First, it can enact by initiative an ordinance that effectively
precludes variances8 6 or conditional use permits87 for the use contem-
plated by the owner. Second, it can veto the owner's zoning amend-
ment through the referendum process 88 or amend the zoning ordinance
a second time to disallow his or her proposed use.
89
Thus, the regulations that apply to a particular piece of property
can be changed through either system. When the change is made by
the local legislative body and its agencies, the procedures may differ
little between the two systems. 90 The primary impact of the label upon
the mechanical process of regulatory change is that the electorate can
veto a modification that is cast in a legislative form and can bypass the
statutory procedures to enact changes that are similarly cast.9'
The ramifications of the legislative-administrative distinction are
much greater when the focus is expanded to include the impact of con-
84. The landowner who brought suit in Arnel Dev. Co. v. City of Costa Mesa, 28 Cal.
3d 511, 620 P.2d 565, 169 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1980), had obtained a rezoning of his property to
allow his planned development. See infra note 159 & accompanying text.
85. However, such actions by the electorate are subject to invalidation if found to be
arbitrary or discriminatory. See Arnel Dev. Co. v. City of Costa Mesa, 126 Cal. App. 3d
330, 178 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1981) (on remand).
86. The statutory criteria for granting a variance "may be supplemented by harmoni-
ous local legislation." Topanga, 11 Cal. 3d at 511, 522 P.2d at 15, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 839
(footnote omitted). Restrictive zoning may render a particular piece of property useless and
may thus constitute an unconstitutional taking. See infra notes 188-89 & accompanying text.
The court noted in Topanga that variances may insulate zoning schemes from constitutional
attack by introducing flexibility into the system. "The primary constitutional concern is that
as applied to a particular land parcel, a zoning regulation may constitute a compensable
'taking' of property." 11 Cal. 3d at 511 & n.4, 522 P.2d at 14 & n.4, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 838 &
n.4. Therefore, there may be a constitutional limitation against the preclusion of variances.
87. E.g., Bayless v. Limber, 26 Cal. App. 3d 463, 102 Cal. Rptr. 647 (1972) (initiative
petition to ban oil well drilling from all areas of city zoned residential after city had granted
a permit to drill an oil well in a residential area).
88. E.g., Dwyer v. City Council, 200 Cal. 505,253 P. 932 (1927) (referendum petition to
veto reclassification of property from residential to business and public use).
89. E.g.,Arnel, 28 Cal. 3d 511, 620 P.2d 565, 169 Cal Rptr. 904. After the supreme
court upheld the use of the initiative to rezone a particular parcel, however, the court of
appeal reviewed the substance of the initiative and found it to be arbitrary and discrinina-
tory. Arnel, 126 Cal. App. 3d 330, 178 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1981) (on remand). See infra notes
210 & 221.
90. This would be particularly true if the jurisdiction had no planning commission or
other administrative body. Then the local legislative body alone would consider and decide
all proposed changes. See supra notes 50-52 & accompanying text. Regardless of the form
of relief, the local government would publish notice, mail notice to neighboring landowners,
and hold public hearings. See supra notes 30-34, 63-65 & accompanying text. Furthermore,
the local body presumably would consider the general public welfare to the same degree
regardless of how the change was labeled.
91. See supra notes 39-44 & accompanying text.
November 1982] LAND USE REGULATION
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
stitutional law. Considerations of procedural due process apply to ad-
ministrative changes, but not to legislative changes.92 The gulf that has
developed between the procedures of the two systems as a result of this
constitutional distinction is explained in the next section, as the case
law leading up to Arnel Development Co. v. City of Costa Mesa is
surveyed.
California Case Law Before Arnel
California has always treated the amendment of a zoning ordi-
nance as a legislative act, regardless of the size of the parcel involved or
the number of persons directly affected.93 Beginning with Dwyer v. City
Council,94 California courts have viewed rezoning as a matter of gen-
eral public concern, because any rezoning alters an integral component
of an entire system of zoning ordinances.95 In Dwyer, the Berkeley
City Council rezoned a smal 96 area from residential use to a business
and public use district to permit the University of California to operate
an experimental poultry farm. The city rejected a referendum petition
submitted by opponents on the ground that the rezoning was local in
nature and not a proper subject for a referendum. 97 The court held
that all rezonings are legislative and therefore may be subject to
referenda. 98
Another argument raised in Dwyer was that the referendum pro-
cess was incompatible with the notice and hearing procedures pre-
92. See infra notes 112-13 & accompanying text.
93. Arnel, 28 Cal. 3d at 517, 620 P.2d at 568, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 907. Although the
California Supreme Court has not always strictly relied upon the label of the change to
determine its character, it has concluded in every case in which it has reviewed a zoning
amendment that the amendment was legislative. See infra notes 166-77 & accompanying
text. Rezonings cited by the Arnel majority as examples of legislative acts with narrow ap-
plication include Dwyer v. City Council, 200 Cal. 505, 253 P. 932 (1927) (parcel constituted
1/550 of the city of Berkeley); Toso v. City of Santa Barbara, 101 Cal. App. 3d 934, 162 Cal.
Rptr. 210 (single lot), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 901 (1980); Ensign Bickford Realty v. City
Council, 68 Cal. App. 3d 467, 137 Cal. Rptr. 304 (1977) (single lot); Hilton v. Board of
Supervisors, 7 Cal. App. 3d 708, 86 Cal. Rptr. 754 (1970) (five acres). Arnel, 28 Cal. 3d at
516-17, 620 P.2d at 568, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 907.
94. 200 Cal. 505, 253 P. 932 (1927).
95. "The restrictions relating to any portion of the city are an integral part of an entire
scheme, and should be the expression of a definite policy. . . . [A] piecemeal rezoning of
small areas may result in a plan differing in vital particulars from that originally contem-
plated." Id at 514-15, 253 P. at 936. SeeArnel, 28 Cal. 3d at 517, 620 P.2d at 568-69, 169
Cal. Rptr. at 907-08; cf. Johnston v. City of Claremont, 49 Cal. 2d 826, 838, 323 P.2d 71, 78
(1958) ("where the wording of ordinances must be changed in order to accomplish the de-
sired revision, the act is legislative and not administrative").
96. The area rezoned was about 1/550 of the area of the city. 200 Cal. at 508, 253 P. at
933.
97. Id at 508-09, 253 P. at 933.
98. Id at 513-15, 253 P. at 935-36.
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scribed by the zoning law.99 Berkeley argued that the referendum
deprived the affected property owners of their right to have the rezon-
ing decided in accordance with these statutorily prescribed procedures.
The court responded that the procedures had been followed in the
adoption of the ordinance and that they did not apply when the ordi-
nance was tested by the referendum process. 1c°
This issue of incompatibility of zoning by popular vote with the
statutory notice and hearing procedures was raised again in Hurst v.
City of Burlingame,'0° after the electorate of Burlingame amended a
zoning ordinance by initiative. Hurst's property was rezoned to resi-
dential use, thereby precluding him from continuing to operate his
lumber yard.'0 2 He argued that the amended ordinance was invalid
because the city authorities failed to comply with the mandatory proce-
dures of the state zoning act. 0 3 The California Supreme Court agreed,
holding that the initiative process could not be used to adopt zoning
ordinances. 1o4
The holding of Hurst was based on the inconsistency of two stat-
utes, the zoning law and the initiative law. The court concluded that
the zoning law "is a special statute dealing with a particular subject and
must be deemed to be controlling over the initiative which is general in
scope."' 0 5 However, the court also suggested in dictum that when no-
tice and hearing requirements are imposed by statute, such notice and
hearing become requirements of due process as well.1°6
99. Id at 515, 253 P. at 936. These procedures were promulgated as part of Berkeley's
city charter and were similar to the statutory zoning procedures prescribed by the Govern-
meat Code. See supra notes 30-35 & accompanying text.
100. 200 Cal. at 516, 253 P. at 936. The court also pointed out that the ordinary demo-
cratic procedures of an election afforded some procedural protections, such as the opportu-
nity to make public arguments. Id
101. 207 Cal. 134, 277 P. 308 (1929), overruled by Associated Home Builders of the
Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 596, 557 P.2d 473, 480, 135 Cal.
Rptr. 41, 48 (1976). See infra notes 114-18 & accompanying text.
102. 207 Cal. at 136-37, 277 P. at 309-10.
103. Id at 137, 277 P. at 310. The state zoning act was an early version of present
Government Code §§ 65800-65912 (West 1966 & Supp. 1981), described supra in notes 24--
35 & accompanying text.
104. 207 Cal. at 142, 277 P. at 312. Dwyer was distinguished because it involved a refer-
endum rather than an initiative. Therefore, the statutory procedures had already been fol-
lowed. See supra notes 99-100 & accompanying text. Hurst did not affect the electorate's
power to veto zoning amendments by referenda. 207 Cal. at 142, 277 P. at 312.
105. 207 Cal. at 141, 277 P. at 311. The state zoning laws as well as the right to exercise
local initiative and referendum powers apply to general law cities only. See supra notes 17
& 39. Therefore, Hurst applied only to general law cities. An analogous incompatibility
problem could arise in a charter city if its charter prescribed zoning procedures and initiative
powers that were inconsistent. For example, in Dwyer, the alleged conflict was between
Berkeley's charter provisions dealing with zoning and the power of the electorate to legislate.
See supra notes 99-100 & accompanying text.
106. "When the statute requires notice and hearing as to the possible effect of a zoning
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Hurst long remained the law, and its due process dictum was often
repeated to support the view that constitutional due process demanded
notice and hearing before a rezoning.10 7 Its dictum was not disap-
proved until 1974,108 and its holding that a general law city cannot use
the initiative process to zone property was valid until 1976.109 Thus,
from 1919 until the mid- 1970's, the notice and hearing requirements of
the zoning law injected concepts of constitutional due process into zon-
ing proceedings. The direct role of the electorate in zoning was re-
stricted during this period to the power to veto rezoning that had been
approved by the local legislators; the electorate could do no more than
preserve the status quo.
The Hurst dictum was disapproved in San Diego Building Contrac-
tors Association v. City Council.I10  The electorate of San Diego had
enacted by initiative an ordinance that limited to thirty feet the height
of buildings to be constructed in the city's coastal zone.'11 The plain-
tiffs asserted that because the ordinance significantly affected their
property rights they had a constitutional right to notice and a hearing
before the ordinance was enacted.'12 The court responded that statutes
of general application may be enacted without notice or hearing to af-
fected parties, because the broad application of legislation makes it im-
practicable to allow individual participation in its enactment. Instead,
the people must protect their rights through their power to elect
legislators. 113
Hurst finally was overruled in Associated Home Builders of the
Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City of Livermore. 14 Livermore is a general
law city, so it is governed by the state zoning law." 5 Despite this fact,
law upon property rights the action of the legislative body becomes quasi judicial in charac-
ter and the statutory notice and hearing then becomes necessary in order to satisfy the re-
quirements of due process and may not be dispensed with." 207 Cal. at 141, 277 P. at 311.
107. See cases cited in San Diego Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. City Council, 13 Cal. 3d
205, 216 n.6, 529 P.2d 570, 577 n.6, 118 Cal. Rptr. 146, 153 n.6 (1974).
108. Id at 216, 529 P.2d at 577, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 153. See infra notes 110-13 & accom-
panying text.
109. Associated Home Builders, 18 Cal. 3d at 596, 557 P.2d at 480, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 48.
See Mnfra notes 114-18 & accompanying text.
110. 13 Cal. 3d 205, 529 P.2d 570, 118 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1974). The court was not faced
with Hurst's holding that the state zoning law precluded zoning by initiative because San
Diego is a charter city, so its charter supersedes the state zoning law. See supra note 17.
111. 13 Cal. 3d at 208, 529 P.2d at 521, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 147.
112. Id at 211, 529 P.2d at 573, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 149.
113. Id The court based its reasoning squarely upon Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of
Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915), in which the Supreme Court reviewed an order of the
Colorado State Board of Equalization that increased by 40% the valuation of all taxable
property in Denver. The Court there held that plaintiff taxpayers had no constitutional right
to notice or hearing before the order was adopted. Id at 445.
114. 18 Cal. 3d 582, 557 P.2d 473, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976).
115. See supra notes 17 & 29.
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the electorate enacted an initiative that put a moratorium on the issu-
ance of building permits until such time as the city's educational, sew-
age disposal, and water supply facilities met certain standards. A
group of people interested in residential construction sued to invalidate
the ordinance on the ground that it was enacted without complying
with the notice and hearing requirements of the state zoning law."
6
The supreme court held that the procedural requirements were not in-
tended by the legislature to apply to initiatives." 7 Furthermore, the
court stated that because the right of initiative is guaranteed in the state
constitution, any statute that barred the use of the initiative "would be
of doubtful constitutionality."
'"8
While the supreme court was opening zoning to direct legislation,
thereby allowing the electorate to bypass the statutory notice and hear-
ing requirements, it was imposing more stringent procedural require-
ments on the administrative side of land use regulation. First, the court
recognized that administrative decisions involve procedural due pro-
cess considerations that are not necessarily satisfied by the statutory
procedures imposed upon administrative agencies. In Scott v. City of
Indian Wells," 9 a landowner whose property was beyond the city lim-
its was found to have a constitutional right to notice and hearing when
the city was considering a land development that would have a signifi-
cant impact on his property. 120 "[I1t is clear that the individual's inter-
est in his property is often affected by local land use controls, and the
'root requirement' of the due process clause is 'that an individual be
given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any signifi-
cant property interest .... 1 "1121
The Indian Wells opinion was followed by Horn v. County of Ven-
116. 18 Cal. 3d at 588, 557 P.2d at 475, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 43. The plaintiffs also asserted
that the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague, and that it unconstitutionally attempted to
bar immigration to Livermore. Id at 588-89, 557 P.2d at 475, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 43.
117. Id at 594, 557 P.2d at 479, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 47.
118. Id at 595, 557 P.2d at 480, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 48. The court explained that Hurst
erroneously treated the state zoning law and the initiative law as statutes of equal status.
Rather, the initiative law merely establishes procedures for exercising the right of initiative.
The constitutional right of initiative itself is superior to the zoning law. Id at 594-95, 557
P.2d at 479-80, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 47-48. See supra text accompanying note 105.
119. 6 Cal. 3d 541, 492 P.2d 1137, 99 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1972).
120. Indian Wells was considering issuing a conditional use permit to allow a large de-
velopment of golf courses, tennis courts and numerous condominium units near the border
of the city. The taller buildings and commercial shops were to be situated behind a hill tominimize their visual impact on Indian Wells. However, the buildings would have blocked
the view of plaintiff Scott and his neighbors who lived beyond the city's limits. The city sent
no notice to nonresidents, and refused to consider their objections to the development. Id at
544-45, 492 P.2d at 1138-39, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 746-47.
121. Id at 549, 492 P.2d at 1141, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 749 (emphasis in original). The court
concluded that "Indian Wells owes adjoining landowners who are not city residents a duty
of notice to the extent given similarly situated city residents, a duty to hear their views, and a
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tura,122 in which the court determined that the approval of a subdivi-
sion was "adjudicatory."1 23  Therefore, it must be preceded by
constitutionally sufficient notice and hearing to parties whose property
rights may be substantially affected by the subdivision.' 24 Ventura
County had approved a subdivision of property without sending notice
to any of the adjoining landowners. 125 Horn alleged that the subdivi-
sion would interfere with access to his parcel and would increase traffic
congestion and air pollution. The court found that these allegations
"adequately described a deprivation sufficiently 'substantial' to require
procedural due process protection."' 126
Ventura County argued that the notice and hearing procedures
imposed by the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), and
followed in the county's environmental review of the proposal, satisfied
due process requirements. 27 The court found that neither the notice
nor the hearing was constitutionally sufficient. The CEQA procedures
placed the burden of obtaining notice on the interested parties them-
selves 28 and were "intended only to evoke and record a public re-
sponse limited to the general environmental aspects of a proposed
project.. . . [Tihe CEQA process does not guarantee an affected land-
owner a 'meaningful' predeprivation hearing. . . at which his specpic
objections to the threatened interference with his property interests
may be raised."' 2
9
The second development that enhanced procedural safeguards in-
volved judicial review of administrative decisions. The administrative
duty to consider the proposed development with respect to its effect on all neighboring prop-
erty owners." Id, 492 P.2d at 1142, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 750.
122. 24 Cal. 3d 605, 596 P.2d 1134, 156 Cal. Rptr. 718 (1979).
123. Id at 614-15, 596 P.2d at 1138, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 722. See infra notes 174-75 &
accompanying text.
124. 24 Cal. 3d at 622-25, 596 P.2d at 1137-40, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 721-24.
125. Because the proposed subdivision involved only four parcels, it was not subject to
the Subdivision Map Act, CAL. GOVT CODE §§ 66410-66499.37 (West Supp. 1981), which
requires notice and hearings. See 24 Cal. 3d at 610, 596 P.2d at 1136, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 720.
126. 24 Cal. 3d at 615, 596 P.2d at 1139, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 723.
127. Id. at 616, 596 P.2d at 1140, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 724.
128. Id. at 617-18, 596 P.2d at 1141, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 725. The county's CEQA proce-
dures required that all CEQA documents be placed in three different county offices, and that
notice of all environmental matters pending before county agencies be mailed to people who
requested such notice. Id at 616-17, 596 P.2d at 1140, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 724.
129. Id at 619, 596 P.2d at 1141, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 726 (emphasis in original) (citations
omitted). The constitutional right to a hearing includes a right to present evidence and to
rebut opposing evidence. Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 18-20 (1938). Furthermore,
"a party. . . is entitled to be represented by counsel retained by him where. . . the party's
interest might be prejudiced if he is denied the right to be represented by an attorney."
Borror v. Department of Inv., 15 Cal. App. 3d 531, 540, 92 Cal. Rptr. 525, 530 (1971). How-
ever, due process does not require that the hearing be a formal judicial proceeding. Ander-
son Nat'l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 246-47 (1944).
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mandamus provision of the California Code of Civil Procedure 30 pro-
vides the structure for reviewing adjudicatory decisions of administra-
tive agencies, 131 including administrative land use decisions.' 32 The
supreme court examined this mandamus provision in Topanga Associa-
tion for a Scenic Community v. County ofLos Angeles' 33 and concluded
that "[s]ection 1094.5 clearly contemplates that at minimum, the re-
viewing court must determine both whether substantial evidence supports
the administrative agency'sfindings and whether thefindings support the
agency's decision."' 134 The court further concluded that "implicit in
section 1094.5 is a requirement that the agency... must set forth find-
ings to bridge the analytic gap between the raw evidence and the ulti-
mate decision or order."'
35
Because California relies upon the label of a land use decision to
decide whether the action is administrative, 136 all actions cast in the
130. CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE § 1094.5 (West 1980).
131. Topanga Ass'n for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles, 11 Cal. 3d 506,
514, 522 P.2d 12, 17, 113 Cal. Rptr. 836, 840 (1974). The administrative mandamus provi-
sion applies to writs "issued for the purpose of inquiring into the validity of any final admin-
istrative order or decision made as a result of a proceeding in which by law a hearing is
required to be given, evidence is required to be taken and discretion in the determination of
facts is vested in the inferior tribunal, corporation, board or officer...." CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 1094.5 (West 1980).
132. See Woodland Hills Residents Ass'n v. City Council, 26 Cal. 3d 938, 609 P.2d 1029,
164 Cal. Rptr. 255 (1980) (subdivision approval); Youngblood v. Board of Supervisors, 22
Cal. 3d 644, 586 P.2d 556, 150 Cal. Rptr. 242 (1978) (approval of tentative subdivision map);
City of Fairfield v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. 3d 768, 537 P.2d 375, 122 Cal. Rptr. 543 (1975)
(use permit); Topanga Ass'n for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles, I1 Cal. 3d
502, 522 P.2d 12, 113 Cal. Rptr. 836 (1974) (variance); Scott v. City of Indian Wells, 6 Cal.
3d 541, 492 P.2d 1137, 99 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1972) (conditional use permit); PMI Mortgage Ins.
Co. v. City of Pacific Grove, 128 Cal. App. 3d 724, 179 Cal. Rptr. 185 (1981) (variance);
Mountain Defense League v. Board of Supervisors, 65 Cal. App. 3d 723, 135 Cal. Rptr. 588
(1977) (private development plan).
133. 11 Cal. 3d 506, 522 P.2d 12, 113 Cal. Rptr. 836 (1974).
134. Id at 514-15, 522 P.2d at 17, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 841 (emphasis added). The court's
conclusion was based on an analysis of subsections (b) and (c) of § 1094.5:
"(b) The inquiry in such a case shall extend to the questions whether the respondent has
proceeded without, or in excess of jurisdiction; whether there was a fair trial; and whether
there was any prejudicial abuse of discretion. Abuse ofdiscretion is established f the respon-
dent has not proceeded in the manner required by law, the order or decision is not supported
by thefindings or the findings are not supported by the evidence.
"(c) Where it is claimed that the findings are not supported by the evidence, in cases in
which the court is authorized by law to exercise its independent judgment on the evidence,
abuse of discretion is established if the court determines that the findings are not supported
by the weight of the evidence; and in all other cases, abuse of discretion is established f the
court determines that the findings are not supported by substantial evidence in the light of the
whole record." CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1094.5(b)-(c) (West 1980) (emphasis added).
135. 11 Cal. 3d at 515, 522 P.2d at 17, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 841 (emphasis added).
136. See Arnel Dev. Co. v. City of Costa Mesa, 28 Cal. 3d 511, 620 P.2d 565, 169 Cal.
Rptr. 904 (1980). See infra note 166 & accompanying text.
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form of a discretionary permit, variance, or other approval 37 are re-
viewed under section 1094.5. Therefore, after Topanga, all agency de-
cisions must be supported by findings, supported in turn by substantial
evidence.138
Another consequence of review under section 1094.5 is that the
administrative proceeding must be "fair."' 139 The meaning of "fair"
within the context of section 1094.5 is unclear. 140 But, because adminis-
trative decisionmaking must meet the constitutional requirements of
notice and predeprivation hearing,141 these proceedings must meet con-
stitutional standards of fairness.
142
In contrast to review of administrative agency decisions, legislative
decisions are reviewed by "ordinary, or so-called traditional, manda-
137. See supra note 132.
138. "Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evi-
dence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Consoli-
dated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938). Section 1094.5(c) requires that the
evidence be viewed "in the light of the whole record," so a court cannot look only for sup-
porting evidence. Bixby v. Pierno, 4 Cal. 3d 130, 149 n.22, 481 P.2d 242, 255 n.22, 93 Cal.
Rptr. 234, 247 n.22 (1971). The United States Supreme Court interpreted similar language
("substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole") to mean that "It]he substantial-
ity must take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight." Universal
Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474,485, 488 (1951). The Court in Universal Camera also
noted that the application of the substantial evidence standard requires some degree of judi-
cial discretion. Id at 489.
It has been suggested that the substantial evidence standard is flexible, and that "[t]he
critical determinant of the intensity of review. . . is the court's confidence in the agency as a
decisionmaker. This in turn depends on a range of factors in addition to the importance of
the right involved: the technical or specialized nature of the issues, the amount of proce-
dural protections afforded at the agency level, the harshness of the penalty imposed, the
gravity of the alleged error, and the political pressures and bias at the agency level." Note,
Tex-Cal Land Management, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Board- Administrative Adju-
dications and the Substantial Evidence Standard of Judicial Review, 68 CALIF. L. REv. 618,
636 (1980) (footnote omitted).
139. "The inquiry in such a case shall extend to the questions. . . whether there was a
fair trial .... " CAL. CIr. PROC. CODE § 1094.5(b) (West 1980).
140. Two land use regulation cases have involved challenges under the § 1094.5 fair
hearing requirement, based on allegations that the administrative body was not impartial,
but both challenges were unsuccessful. Woodland Hills Residents Ass'n v. City Council, 26
Cal. 3d 938, 609 P.2d 1029, 164 Cal. Rptr. 255 (1980) (receipt by city council members of
campaign contributions from parties who have a financial interest in an administrative pro-
ceeding does not prevent a fair hearing before those members); City of Fairfield v. Superior
Court, 14 Cal. 3d 768, 537 P.2d 375, 122 Cal. Rptr. 543 (1975) (campaign statements expres-
sing opposition to a proposal will not disqualify an elected official from voting on the
proposal).
141. See supra notes 122-29 & accompanying text.
142. "When the Constitution requires a hearing, it requires a fair one, one before a
tribunal which meets at least currently prevailing standards of impartiality." Wong Yang
Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 50 (1950); see Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975) (due
process requirement of a fair tribunal applies to administrative agencies that adjudicate as
well as to courts).
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mus." 143 The purpose of the traditional writ of mandate is to compel
the performance of a legal duty.144 The duty of legislators in enacting
zoning legislation is to promote the public health, safety, morals or gen-
eral welfare, 145 and their decisions are presumed to be valid.1 46 There-
fore, when a court reviews zoning legislation, its role is limited to
deciding whether there is a "real or substantial relation" between the
legislation and the public welfare. 147 A reviewing court does not con-
cern itself with the legislators' motives. Rather, it will uphold the legis-
lative decision if there is any rational basis which the legislators "may
have had in mind."' 48 Consequently, legislative decisions need not be
accompanied by findings. 149 Furthermore, the legislators need not be
impartial and the proceedings need not be "fair."150
During the 1970's, land use regulation procedures changed dra-
matically. On the legislative side, zoning was freed of any procedural
due process constraints and was opened to direct enactment by the
electorate. 151 On the administrative side, the statutory procedures were
supplemented by the requirements of constitutionally sufficient notice
and hearing to all parties whose property interests may be significantly
affected. Furthermore, administrators were required to support their
143. Ensign Bickford Realty v. City Council, 68 Cal. App. 3d 467, 473, 137 Cal. Rptr.
304, 307 (1977).
144. Professional Eng'rs in Cal. Gov't v. State Personnel Bd., 114 Cal. App. 3d 101, 170
Cal. Rptr. 547 (1980). "[A writ] may be issued by any court ... to an inferior court, to any
inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or person, to compel the performance of an act which
the law specially enjoins... ." CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1085 (West 1980).
145. See supra note 1.
146. See supra note 2 & accompanying text.
147. Miller v. Board of Pub. Works, 195 Cal. 477,490,234 P. 381,385 (1925). Of course,
legislators also have a duty not to violate the state or federal constitutions or other laws in
the course of exercising their police powers to regulate land, and this duty may be enforced
by a traditional writ of mandate. For example, zoning ordinances cannot unfairly discrimi-
nate against a particular parcel of land. Wilkins v. City of San Bernardino, 29 Cal. 2d 332,
338, 175 P.2d 542, 547 (1946). Zoning administration is subject to these same restrictions.
See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (use permits cannot be issued in a dis-
criminatory manner). Therefore, in the course of comparing the standards of review of leg-
islative and administrative land use decisions, these secondary bases for invalidating land
use regulation will be disregarded.
148. Miller v. Board of Pub. Works, 195 Cal. 477, 490, 234 P. 381, 386 (1925) (emphasis
added).
149. See Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 186 (1935) (validity of
a regulation made by an administrative body under a state statute is not dependent on the
making of special findings of fact when not required by the statute).
150. The traditional mandamus provision does not authorize the court to inquire into
the fairness of the proceedings. See supra note 144. Because there is no constitutional re-
quirement that legislation be preceded by notice or hearing to affected parties, see supra
notes 37, 113 & accompanying text, the reviewing court does not look to see whether the
hearing, if one was held, was fair. The constitutional requirement that administrators be
impartial stems from the requirement that a hearing be provided. See supra note 142.
151. See supra notes 110-18 & accompanying text.
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decisions with appropriate findings. 152 These divergent developments
aggravated the consequences of the legislative-adjudicative distinction.
As an example of the procedural ramifications of the legislative-
adjudicative distinction, consider the situation of the property owner in
Horn v. County of Ventura.153 Before the county can approve the divi-
sion of neighboring property into four parcels, an administrative deci-
sion, Horn has a right to notice reasonably calculated to apprise him of
the subdivision application. Then he has a right to have a hearing dur-
ing which his specific concerns will be considered by impartial deci-
sionmakers and at which he can be represented by counsel, present his
evidence, and rebut other evidence. The administrators' decision must
be supported by findings supported by substantial evidence. Horn can
have the decision reviewed to determine whether the hearing was fair,
the proceedings were in accordance with the law, and the decision was
supported by substantial evidence. Of course, the owner of the lot pro-
posed for subdivision has the same rights as Horn.
If, instead, a legislative rezoning of the neighboring land is pro-
posed to allow multifamily dwellings, neighbor Horn will be in a much
weaker position to protect his property interest. A rezoning by the lo-
cal legislative body will be preceded by the statutorily required notice
and public hearings, but these hearings may be structured more for the
expression of general public opinion than for the consideration of any
particular party's objections. The legislators may be partial, and their
decision is presumed valid and need not be accompanied by findings.
The impact upon Horn's land will probably be similar in the two
cases-potential interference with access to his parcel, increased traffic
and air pollution-yet in the latter case, Horn is accorded no due pro-
cess rights to protect his property interests. The rationale for the ab-
sence of due process protection in connection with legislation is based
upon the theoretically broad impact of legislation. The large number
of persons affected makes it impracticable to afford them all a hearing.
The broad impact also means that objections can be voiced
politically. 1
5 4
In the case of a small-scale rezoning, however, the impact on the
owner and immediate neighbors of the subject property is often far
greater than the impact on the general population. The small number
of significantly affected parties indicates that the political response on
152. See supra notes 119-38 & accompanying text.
153. 24 Cal. 605, 596 P.2d 1134, 156 Cal. Rptr. 718 (1979). See supra notes 122-29 &
accompanying text.
154. Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915); San
Diego Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. City Council, 13 Cal. 3d 205, 211, 529 P.2d 570, 573, 118
Cal. Rptr. 146, 149 (1974). "For protection against abuses by legislatures the people must
resort to the polls, not to the courts." Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1876). See supra
note 113 & accompanying text.
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their behalf to the legislation will be weak. The small number also
means that providing them with notice and hearing would not be as
great a burden as it would be in the case of more general legislation. 155
The rationale for denying notice and hearing becomes weaker as the
impact of the legislation becomes narrower.
The disparity between the procedures afforded in adjudicative and
legislative actions becomes even more stark, and the rationale for that
disparity even weaker, when the electorate rezones small parcels by ini-
tiative. No hearing is provided to affected parties, except for whatever
"hearing" they can accomplish by appealing directly to the voters in
the course of the campaign. The electorate can be as interested or dis-
interested as it chooses. Many voters will not even vote on the initia-
tive.' 56 Unlike elected legislators, the individual votes of the electorate
are never scrutinized or publicized. Because the electorate effects the
change, it will be difficult for the landowners involved to find adequate
recourse through the political system.
157
The use of the initiative power to rezone the land of only a few
people, then, is the situation in which the legislative-adjudicative dis-
tinction based on labels has the most irrational impact on the due pro-
155. Although this discussion implicitly portrays the conflict as being between the land-
owners in the area of the rezoning and the rest of the electorate in the jurisdiction, the
conflict may more commonly be between a particular landowner who wants to develop his
or her land and adjoining landowners. "Most zoning amendment controversies are...
three-sided, involving the directly affected landowner or developer, the city council, and the
indirectly affected neighbors." Glenn, State Law Limitations on the Use of Initiatives and
Referenda in Connection with Zoning Amendments, 51 S. CAL. L. Rnv. 265, 271 (1978).
156. For example, the initiative at issue in Arnel was voted on by only 23% of Costa
Mesa's registered voters. See Note, supra note 12, at 1108 n.10. The initiative to put a
moratorium on all building permits in Livermore was voted on by only 36% of the registered
voters of that city. Associated Home Builders of the Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City of
Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 615 n.4, 557 P.2d 473, 492 n.4, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 60 n.4 (1976)
(Clark, J., dissenting).
157. To be successful, the landowners would have to convince popularly elected officials
to overturn the electorate's decision, or they would have to put the issue to another vote, a
costly and time-consuming proposition.
Although the adoption of an adjudicative process would necessarily deprive the electo-
rate of its power to legislate directly, it would not deprive it of ultimate power over land use
regulation. The electorate has the power to protect its interests through the political process
that a handful of landowners does not have. Furthermore, if the conffict is between a land-
owner and his or her neighbors, see supra note 155, the use of direct legislation is particu-
larly inappropriate, as it would be tantamount to delegating control over the zoning of a
particular parcel to the neighbors. That is, direct legislation allows neighbors, whose votes
can comprise the majority of the typically small turnout in rezoning elections, see supra note
156, to control the election results. The delegation of zoning control to neighbors has been
disapproved by the United States Supreme Court. See Washington ex rel. Seattle Title
Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928); Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137
(1912); see also Glenn, supra note 155, at 271 n.27 ("In these cases, it is generally the neigh-
bors who will avail themselves of the direct legislation devices.").
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cess rights of landowners. This was the situation presented to the
California Supreme Court in Arnel Development Co. v. City of Costa
Mesa. 158
Arnel Development Co. v. City of Costa Mesa
The Arnel Development Company sought to build a residential
development on fifty acres of land in Costa Mesa. In 1976, the city
approved Arnel's development plan and rezoned the property to allow
the planned development. 159 After final approval was given by the city
in 1977, a Costa Mesa homeowners' association submitted an initiative
petition to rezone the Arnel property to allow only single-family resi-
dential development. 160 In early 1978, the initiative was adopted by the
voters, and the city thereafter refused to take any more steps to approve
Arnel's project.
161
Arnel sued for mandate, injunctive relief, and declaratory relief.
The trial court upheld the validity of the initiative, but the court of
appeal reversed and held that the rezoning of specific, relatively small
parcels is adjudicatory and, therefore, not a proper subject for an initia-
tive. 162 The state supreme court, on its own motion, transferred the
case for review,163 and reversed the court of appeal, stating that "Cali-
fornia precedent has settled the principle that zoning ordinances,
whatever the size of parcel affected, are legislative acts."'
6
Justice Tobriner began the majority opinion 165 by listing numer-
ous cases which have held that zoning is a legislative act, and con-
cluded from them that "whatever the legal controversy and whatever
the size or ownership of the land involved, every California decision on
158. 28 Cal. 3d 511, 620 P.2d 565, 169 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1980).
159. In its final form, the plan contemplated 127 single-family residences on 23 acres
and 539 apartment units on a comparable area, primarily for moderate income housing.
The zoning was changed from low- and medium-density residential, to low- and medium-
density planned residential development. Id at 515, 620 P.2d at 567, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 906.
160. The initiative also proposed to rezone 17.6 acres of adjacent land that belonged to
two other parties. One of these owners also filed suit, and the two actions were consolidated
for trial. Id at 514-15, 620 P.2d at 567, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 906.
161. Id. at 515, 620 P.2d at 567, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 906. The initiative was supported by
12% and opposed by 11% of Costa Mesa's registered voters. Seventy-seven percent did not
vote on the initiative. See Note, supra note 12, at 1108 n. 10.
162. 28 Cal. 3d at 515-16, 620 P.2d at 567-68, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 906-07.
163. Id. at 514, 620 P.2d at 566, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 905. The city attorney of Costa Mesa
did not defend the initiative. Therefore, he did not petition the supreme court for review
after the court of appeal held the initiative invalid. The supreme court transferred it "to
secure uniformity of decision and settle an important question of law. Id at 514 n.3,
620 P.2d at 566 n.3, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 905 n.3.
164. Id at 514, 620 P.2d at 566-67, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 906.
165. Justices Bird, Mosk, and Manuel concurred in the opinion, and Justice Newman
concurred in the result. Justice Richardson wrote the dissent, in which Justice Clark
concurred.
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point. . . has held that the enactment or amendment of a zoning ordi-
nance is a legislative act."' 166 The court found the rationale for this rule
in Dwyer v. City Council:167 "'A zoning ordinance as amended be-
comes in effect a different ordinance. . .[and] a piecemeal rezoning of
small areas may result in a plan differing in vital particulars from that
originally contemplated. .... ",168 Because the electorate has an inter-
est in the whole zoning system, it has an interest in all of its parts.
169
Justice Tobriner then addressed the language and reasoning of two
supreme court opinions that, the dissent argued, had adopted a new
approach to determining whether an act was legislative. In San Diego
Building Contractors Association v. City Council,170 the court had distin-
guished between adjudication and legislation by stating that the former
was an action "determined by facts peculiar to the individual case,"
whereas the latter action involved the establishment of "a broad, gener-
ally applicable rule of conduct on the basis of a general public pol-
icy."'17 1 In Horn v. County of Ventura,172 the court stated, "We expressly
cautioned in San Diego that land use planning decisions less than gen-
eral rezoning could not be insulated from notice and hearing require-
ments by application of the 'legislative act' doctrine.' 73 The Horn
court repeated the basis of the legislative-adjudicative distinction de-
scribed in San Diego,174 then characterized subdivision approvals as
actions that "involve the application of general standards to particular
parcels of real estate," and concluded that such conduct was adjudica-
166. 28 Cal. 3d at 516-17, 620 P.2d at 568, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 907. The court also re-
viewed in a footnote various cases involving administrative land use decisions, and came to
a similar conclusion: "[Tihe courts have not resolved the legislative or adjudicative charac-
ter of administrative land use decisions on a case by case basis, but instead have established
a generic rule that variances, use permits, subdivision maps, and similar proceedings are
necessarily adjudicative." Id at 519 n.8, 620 P.2d at 569 n.8, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 908 n.8.
167. 200 Cal. 505, 253 P. 932 (1927).
168. 28 Cal. 3d 511, 517, 620 P.2d 565, 568-69, 169 Cal. Rptr. 904, 907-08 (1980) (quot-
ing Dwyer, 200 Cal. at 515, 253 P. at 936).
169. See supra notes 94-98 & accompanying text.
170. 13 Cal. 3d 205, 529 P.2d 570, 118 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1974). See supra notes 110-13 &
accompanying text.
171. 13 Cal. 3d at212-13, 529 P.2d at 574, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 150. In San Diego, the court
concluded that the ordinance before it, which limited the height of all buildings in the city's
coastal zone, was "unquestionably a general legislative act .... [Niotice and hearing have
never been constitutional prerequisites for the adoption of such a legislative enactment." Id
172. 24 Cal. 3d 605, 596 P.2d 1134, 156 Cal. Rptr. 718 (1979). See supra notes 122-29 &
accompanying text.
173. Horn, 24 Cal. 3d at 613, 596 P.2d at 1138, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 722.
174. "[In holding in San Diego that the enactment of a general zoning ordinance was
legislative], we distinguished 'adjudicatory' matters in which 'the government's action affect-
ing an individual [is] determined by facts peculiar to the individual case' from 'legislative'
decisions which involve the adoption of a 'broad, generally applicable rule of conduct on the
basis of general public policy."' Id
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tory.175 Justice Tobriner explained that the language of San Diego and
Horn was used only to distinguish between the two general categories,
not as a basis for analyzing the particular government action before the
court. 176 Neither the outcome of San Diego nor that of Horn varied
from the rule that rezoning is legislative and that various other acts,
including subdivision approvals, are adjudicative.
177
The plaintiff argued that the rule that rezoning is a legislative act
operated to deprive it of due process of law.' 78 The court rejected this
contention, relying primarily upon the United States Supreme Court's
opinion in City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc. 179 In
Eastlake, the Supreme Court accepted a state court's characterization
of a proposed zoning amendment as "legislative"' 180 and held that the
175. Id at 614, 596 P.2d at 1138, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 722.
176. "Although our opinion [in San Diego] described the initiative as a 'general' legisla-
tive act ..., we did so to distinguish the great number of more limited '"administrative"
zoning decisions, such as the grant of a variance or the award of a conditional use permit,
which are adjudicatory in nature.'" 28 Cal. 3d at 518, 620 P.2d at 569, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 908
(citations omitted). In Horn, "[w]e did not ...conclude that the particular subdivision
approval at issue was adjudicatory in character by examining the size of the subdivision or
the number of persons affected. Instead we stated a generic rule . Id at 518-19, 620
P.2d at 569-70, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 908-09.
177. For a discussion of the "characterization analysis" typified by San Diego and Horn
and rejected in Arnel, see Note, supra note 12, at 1115-21.
178. 28 Cal. 3d at 519, 620 P.2d at 570, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 909.
179. 426 U.S. 668 (1976). The Supreme Court reviewed a city charter provision that
required all zoning ordinance changes to be approved by 55% of the electorate by referen-
dum. Id at 670. A developer challenged the ordinance after its proposed zoning change
failed to receive the requisite approval.
The Ohio Supreme Court had ruled that the proposed zoning was "legislative" and
therefore could be subject to the referendum power. However, the charter provision that
delegated the zoning power to the electorate lacked standards to guide the decision of the
voters. The Ohio court held that without such standards, the delegation could result in the
arbitrary and capricious exercise of the police power. Therefore, the provision violated
landowners' due process rights. 41 Ohio St. 2d 187, 195-96, 324 N.E.2d 740, 746-47 (1975).
"The Supreme Court of Ohio rested its decision solely on the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. . . .The only questions presented to this Court in the petition for
certiorari concern the validity of that due process holding. . . . Accordingly, we confine
ourselves to considering whether due process is denied by the challenged charter [provi-
sion]." 426 U.S. at 677 n.l 1 (citation omitted).
180. "To be subject to Ohio's referendum procedure, the question must be one within
the scope of legislative power. The Ohio Supreme Court expressly found that the City
Council's action in rezoning respondent's eight acres from light industrial to high-density
residential use was legislative in nature." 426 U.S. at 673. In a footnote, the Court went on
to justify this characterization, stating, 'The land use change requested by respondent would
likely entail the provision of additional city services, such as schools and police and fire
protection. Cf. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 143 n.4 (1971). The change would also
diminish the land area available for industrial purposes, thereby affecting Eastlake's poten-
tial economic development." 426 U.S. at 673 n.7. James v. Valtierra, which the Court cited
as analogous support for the legislative characterization of the rezoning of eight acres, was a
challenge to California's requirement that low-rent housing projects be approved by referen-
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exercise of legislative power by the people through the referendum pro-
cess does not violate due process.' 8' However, the Eastlake Court did
not address the question whether a label may determine whether a
given specific zoning change is "legislative" for purposes of constitu-
tional due process. 8 2 Therefore, the Arnel court's reliance on Eastlake
is misplaced.
The state due process claim was rejected without analysis of the
adjudicative nature of small-scale rezonings. Instead, the court simply
repeated that California has always treated amendments of zoning or-
dinances as legislative acts. Therefore, constitutional due process con-
siderations do not apply to rezoning.
183
After it disposed of the due process issue, the court discussed the
virtue of California's reliance on labels to classify land use decisions as
legislative or adjudicative. Ease of application is the essential attrac-
tion of this classification method. This simplifies the land use regula-
tory process because proponents and opponents of a proposed measure
can readily determine whether the measure is subject to a popular vote,
whether review should be under the ordinary or the administrative
mandamus provisions, and whether the decision must have only a ra-
tional basis or must be supported by substantial evidence. 184 In the
absence of this clear test for distinguishing legislative from adjudicative
action, local governments would be unsure of how to proceed on a pro-
posed measure, and resources would be wasted litigating the character
of an action.' 85
dum. The referendum requirement was upheld, as such projects "may lead to large expendi-
tures of local governmental funds for increased public services and to lower tax revenues."
402 U.S. at 143 (footnote omitted). Footnote 4 of James, which was cited in particular by
the Eastlake Court, is a further explication of the citywide fiscal impact of low-rent housing
projects. Id at 143 n.4.
181. 426 U.S. at 677-78. See Wolfstone, The Casefor a Procedural Due Process Limita-
tion on the Zoning Referendur City of Easdake Revisited, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 51, 89-94 (1978).
182. See Glenn, supra note 155, at 299 n.159; cf. Developments in the Law-Zoning,
supra note 81, at 1536; Note, supra note 12, at 1126-28.
183. 28 Cal. 3d at 521, 620 P.2d at 571, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 910.
184. Id at 522, 620 P.2d at 572, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 911. "This method of classifying land-
use decisions enjoys the obvious advantage of economy; the municipality, the proponents of
a proposed measure, and the opponents of the measure can readily determine if notice,
hearings, and findings are required, what form ofjudicial review is appropriate, and whether
the measure can be enacted by initiative or overturned by referendum." Id at 523, 620 P.2d
at 572, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 911.
185. Id at 523, 620 P.2d at 572, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 911. The court stated in a footnote that
"[a] holding that rezoning of relatively small parcels is an adjudicative act would necessarily
imply that decisions presently considered adjudicative, such as the grant of a use permit or
the approval of a subdivision map, would henceforth be classified as legislative acts if they
affected a relatively large parcel of property." Id at 522 n. 11, 620 P.2d at 572 n. 11, 169 Cal.
Rptr. at 911 n.ll. However, the fact that administrative relief will have a broad impact need
not put it in the "legislative" category. Permits and approvals are always issued in response
to individual applications, and are decided on the basis of criteria set out in the ordinance,
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The counterargument to this efficiency rationale is that due pro-
cess rights are not dependent upon their efficient accommodation
within the system. The Arnel court, however, asserted that landowners'
property interests are adequately protected without due process rights
of notice and hearing. For example, the landowner retains his or her
constitutional protection against zoning which is arbitrary or unreason-
able. 186 This right can be vindicated, however, only through an attack
on a final legislative decision that is presumed to be valid; the land-
owner must show a court that there is no rational basis which the legis-
lators may have had in mind. 187 The landowner can also invalidate a
zoning ordinance that precludes substantially all use of his or her
land.188 Again, an attack on a presumptively valid legislative decision
is required. Furthermore, even if the ordinance is found to deprive the
owner of substantially all use of the land,18 9 the particular ordinance
will simply be invalidated; the owner cannot collect damages for the
period during which the regulation effected a taking. °90
TheArnel court also noted that landowners' interests are protected
by their statutory right to notice and hearing when the government re-
zones, as well as their opportunity to present their case to the electorate
which are applied to the facts of the particular application. See supra notes 71-81 & accom-
panying text. It would be reasonable to maintain the "adjudicative" label for all forms of
administrative relief, and expand the "adjudicative" category to include small-scale rezon-
ings. "The heart of the problem [of procedural unfairness in local zoning practices] is the
underinclusiveness of the adjudicatory category ...." Wolfstone, supra note 18 1, at 82.
186. 28 Cal. 3d at 524, 620 P.2d at 573, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 912.
187. See supra notes 143-50 & accompanying text. If an ordinance is found to be arbi-
trary or unreasonable, it is invalidated, but the government did not commit a tort in passing
the ordinance and-need not compensate the landowner for any loss incurred during the
period the ordinance was in effect. HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 542 P.2d
237, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976); see Gilliland v. County of
Los Angeles, 126 Cal. App. 3d 610, 615-17, 179 Cal. Rptr. 73, 76-78 (1981).
188. 28 Cal. 3d at 524, 620 P.2d at 573, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 912.
189. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372
(1979), aft'd, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). A mere decrease in the value of property as a result of
zoning does not amount to an unconstitutional taking. HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal.
3d 508, 542 P.2d 237, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976).
190. Compensation is not an available remedy because such a remedy would have a
chilling effect on the exercise of the police powers by local governments. Agins, 24 Cal. 3d at
273-76, 598 P.2d at 28-31, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 375-78. It appears, however, that the United
States Supreme Court may disagree with California's bar on recovery for regulatory takings.
The Court recently considered San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S.
621 (1981), which involved the Agins rule. Although the appeal was dismissed for absence
of a final judgment, Justices Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, and Powell stated in their dissent
that they would have reversed the California Supreme Court on the question of compensa-
tion for a regulatory taking. Id at 639-40. Justice Rehnquist stated in his concurrence that
he would have generally agreed with the dissenters if he thought the appeal was from a final
judgment. Id at 633-34. See Burrows v. City of Keene, 121 N.H. 590, 432 A.2d 15 (1981)
(following the reasoning of the dissenters in San Diego Gas & Electric).
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when the people rezone. 19 Of course, the hearing preceding a rezoning
will vary among jurisdictions and among particular proposals, but such
a hearing will not necessarily address the specific concerns of the land-
owner and is not required to be fair.
192
Finally, the court perceived little risk that landowners' interests
would be abused by the legislators. "[A]s a practical matter the initia-
tive is unlikely to be employed in matters which could fairly be charac-
terized as adjudicative in character.'' 93 Furthermore, the substance of
zoning changes would be restricted by the statutory mandate that ordi-
nances be consistent with the general plan 94 and by the further re-
quirement that zoning changes be reasonably related to the regional
welfare. 95 The court concluded that "[tihe spectre of a few voters im-
posing their selfish interests upon an objecting city and region has no
basis in reality."'
96
In summary, the Arnel court interpreted California precedent as
having established a generic rule that all rezoning is legislative. The
court perceived no issue of a potential deprivation of constitutional due
process in the application of this rule to small-scale rezonings, and be-
191. 28 Cal. 3d at 524, 620 P.2d at 573, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 912.
192. See supra notes 38, 129 & accompanying text. "The right to a hearing, however,
would be a hollow one absent additional procedural requirements that ensure the integrity
and responsibility of the decisionmaking process. A landowner's opportunity to argue his
case in a hearing whose outcome is preordained or whose decisionmaker harbors illegitimate
biases against him protects none of the interests underlying due process." Developments in
the Lan--Zoning, supra note 81, at 1525 (footnote omitted).
193. 28 Cal. 3d at 524, 620 P.2d at 573, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 912. The court theorized that
the burden of collecting signatures of 10% of the registered voters for an initiative petition
and then convincing a majority of the voters to support the initiative would practically re-
strict the use of the initiative to broad, general policy questions. Id The initiative that
rezoned Arnel's land was supported by only 12% of Costa Mesa's registered voters. See
supra notes 155-56, 161 & accompanying text.
194. 28 Cal. 3d at 524, 620 P.2d at 573, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 912. However, the plan can be
amended concurrently. See supra note 27 & accompanying text.
195. 28 Cal. 3d at 524, 620 P.2d at 573, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 912. See Associated Home
Builders of the Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 557 P.2d 473, 135
Cal. Rptr. 4 (1976). On remand, the court of appeal found that the rezoning of Arners
property had no rational relation to the regional welfare. Arnel Dev. Co. v. City of Costa
Mesa, 126 Cal. App. 3d 330, 339-40, 178 Cal. Rptr. 723, 728-29 (1981).
196. 28 Cal. 3d at 524, 620 P.2d at 573, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 912. On remand, the court of
appeal reviewed some of the findings of the trial court, including the trial court's conclusion
that "the primary objective of the proponents of the initiative was to stop the development of
apartments in the Amel project notwithstanding the acute shortage of moderate income
housing in the city.... ." 126 Cal. App. 3d at 335, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 726. In this case, a
small group of voters was defeated in its attempt to impose its will, but this defeat came
about only because the developer was willing to litigate the issue for over four years. The
rezoning of this small parcel did not generate objections from the city or the region, even
though it might cause harm to the region. The interests of a landowner that are affected by
the rezoning must be worth a relatively large sum for the landowner to pursue the potential
remedies.
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lieved that departure from the rule would create confusion and spawn
litigation without enhancing the property owner's protections to any
substantial degree.
It is unlikely that California will abandon its reliance on labels in
the near future. By reasserting the reasoning of Dwyer-that every re-
zoning is a matter of general public concern because piecemeal rezon-
ing may radically alter the whole system-the court in Arnel left no
room for finding rezoning too inconsequential to be a proper subject of
"legislation."'' 97 California precedent certainly supports the Arnet
court in its result, if not totally in its reasoning. That is, although
courts have always found rezoning to be legislative, they have some-
times done so without relying strictly on labels. 98 Furthermore, the
California Supreme Court has always shown great deference to legisla-
tive judgment in the exercise of its police power to regulate land use. 199
Finally, the right of the electorate to exercise the powers of initiative
and referendum is often touted by the California Supreme Court,
2 0° so
it is unlikely that the court will remove rezoning from the reach of di-
rect action by the electorate.
It is also unlikely that the United States Supreme Court will rule
on the due process issue involved in California's reliance on labels.
The Court declined to address the issue in Eastlake20° and has long
exhibited a preference for leaving resolution of zoning matters to local
agencies. 2
02
In the absence of judicial intervention to ensure that due process
concerns are addressed, the legislature should increase statutory safe-
guards to encourage reasonable and fair land use regulation. The next
section suggests statutory modifications that will help to mitigate the
procedural consequences of California's reliance on labels.
197. See supra notes 167-69 & accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 170-75 & accompanying text.
199. See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 276, 598 P.2d 25, 30, 157 Cal.
Rptr. 372, 377 (1979) (allowing damages in suit to invalidate zoning ordinance "would have
a chilling effect upon the exercise of police regulatory powers at the local level ....");
Associated Home Builders of the Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582,
609, 557 P.2d 473, 489, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 57 (1976) (although courts can defer to the local
legislative body on the question whether an ordinance reasonably relates to the regional
welfare, "it cannot be assumed that a land use ordinance can never be invalidated as an
enactment in excess of the police power"); Lockard v. City of Los Angeles, 33 Cal. 2d 453,
202 P.2d 38 (1949).
200. See, e.g., Associated Home Builders, 18 Cal. 3d at 591, 557 P.2d at 477, 135 Cal.
Rptr. at 45 ("Declaring it 'the duty of the courts to jealously guard this right of the people'
...the courts have described the initiative and referendum as articulating 'one of the most
precious rights of our democratic process.' ") (citations omitted).
201. See supra notes 178-82 & accompanying text.
202. See Wolfstone, supra note 181, at 94-95; Note, Zoning--A4djdication by Labels:
Referendum Rezoning and Due Process, 55 N.C.L. REv. 517, 518 (1977). See supra note 3.
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Proposals for Further Statutory Safeguards
The major procedural consequences of attaching a "legislative" la-
bel to an action are that (1) the electorate can decide the issue by popu-
lar vote; (2) the decision need not be supported by findings; (3) the
decision is presumed valid, so it need not be supported by substantial
evidence; and (4) parties affected by the action have no constitutional
right to notice or hearing. Furthermore, because no hearing is constitu-
tionally required, there is no right to present or rebut evidence, or to
have impartial decisionmakers.
The most obvious way to avoid these consequences is to avoid at-
taching a legislative label to a regulatory modification. There is a
broad overlap between the administrative and legislative regulatory
systems, 20 3 and within this broad area, local agencies should be re-
quired to effect changes through administrative means before resorting
to rezoning.204 Parties who apply for zoning changes should be re-
quired first to apply for administrative relief.205 Then the people who
would be significantly affected by the proposed change will have a right
to constitutionally sufficient notice and a hearing at which their specific
concerns must be addressed. Evidence will be accepted and the deci-
sion will be made by impartial officials. The administrative decision
must be evidenced by findings that are supported by substantial
evidence.
This requirement of "exhaustion of administrative remedies" will
act primarily to protect neighbors of the subject property. The owner
of the subject property always has the option of applying for adminis-
trative relief, having a hearing, and appealing the decision under the
substantial evidence standard. However, the applicant can also apply
for a rezoning and thereby waive not only his or her own due process
rights but also the due process rights of neighbors. An applicant who
believes the local agency will be supportive of his or her plans may
prefer to apply for legislative relief, thereby avoiding the demands of a
few neighbors that they be given a constitutionally sufficient hearing
and achieving a decision which has a strong presumption of validity.
20 6
When opposition to the change does not extend beyond the immediate
203. See supra notes 81-90 & accompanying text.
204. Major changes that directly reflect general policy decisions--such as the rezoning
of a large area of land, initiated by the local agency itself to implement long-range plans-
are beyond the area of overlap and are appropriately labeled "legislative" within the various
definitions of that term. See supra notes 69-81 & accompanying text. These changes would
continue to be made through legislative means.
205. For example, a landowner who wants to build a multifamily dwelling in a district
zoned for single-family residences should be required first to pursue a conditional use permit
or other exception.
206. If the proposed change would not particularly promote the public welfare, then
choosing legislative relief would spare the local agency the possibly difficult task (due to the
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neighbors, it is unlikely that there will be a political response to a re-
zoning to protect the interests of these neighbors.
Of course, a local body could go through the required procedures
as a formality, deny the administrative relief, and then proceed to effect
the change legislatively. This approach would insulate a controversial
change from effective judicial review. 20 7 The immediate neighbors
may not have the political support to overturn the decision. However,
the initial administrative proceedings will have created a record of evi-
dence which may be valuable in attacking the rezoning. 20 8 Although a
court will not examine the motives of legislators when it is deciding
whether a rezoning is arbitrary, it will look into motive and purpose
when determining whether a zoning ordinance is discriminatory. 209
The neighbors will be able to present their evidence to the legislators
during the administrative proceeding. This record will reveal the infor-
mation and arguments before the legislators, and can be used to
demonstrate discriminatory purpose.
210
The statutory system should also be modified to require that legis-
lative land use decisions be supported by findings. A findings require-
ment should have the same beneficial effect in the legislative setting as
it has in the administrative setting: "to conduce the administrative
body to draw legally relevant sub-conclusions supportive of its ultimate
decision; the intended effect is to facilitate orderly analysis and mini-
mize the likelihood that the agency will randomly leap from evidence
to conclusions." 21' A findings requirement would also promote the due
process concerns that the proceeding seem fair and reasonable and that
the individual be left with an understanding of what has happened and
why.212
imprudence of allowing the change at all) of making findings to support the decision. Also,
an interested official can vote on a legislative decision but not an administrative decision.
207. See REAL PROP. L. REP. (CEB) 27 (March 1981) ("Local governments can continue
to operate in fairly free disregard of judicial supervision as long as they learn to cast their
actions in a legislative rather than an adjudicatory form.").
208. Legislative hearings also create a record, but the hearings may not involve the con-
sideration of as much evidence and argument as constitutionally mandated hearings of ad-
ministrative proceedings. See supra notes 38, 126 & accompanying text.
209. Arnel Dev. Co. v. City of Costa Mesa, 126 Cal. App. 3d 330, 335, 175 Cal. Rptr.
723, 726 (1981) (on remand).
210. For example, in Arnel, the court of appeal, on remand, examined the voter pam-
phlet arguments in favor of the initiative ordinance as well as other circumstances of the
rezoning, and found a discriminatory purpose behind the rezoning. IaL at 335-37, 178 Cal.
Rptr. at 725-27.
211. Topanga Ass'n for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles, 11 Cal. 3d 506,
516, 522 P.2d 12, 18, 113 Cal. Rptr. 836, 842 (1974). "The indictment of zoning to which all
critics subscribe is that its administration is arbitrary and capricious. Procedural due process
is continually flaunted in our medieval hearings, our casual record keeping and our occult
decision-making." R. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME 135 (1966).
212. See Kahn, supra note 9, at 1024, 1026-27.
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In the context of direct legislation by the electorate, there are few
procedural safeguards because the procedural requirements of the state
zoning law do not apply to direct legislation.213 Furthermore, there is
little potential for procedural restrictions because statutory procedural
requirements may not impede the electorate's state constitutional right
to exercise legislative power.214 However, the environment in which
the electorate reaches its decision can only be enhanced by greater and
more reliable information. The California Election Code provides that
an initiative may be supported and opposed by the proponents and the
local legislative body, respectively, each with a written argument not to
exceed three hundred words.215 This limit on information is unreason-
able when compared to the information that would be generated if the
proposal were before the local legislative body.216 The local planning
commission and legislative body should be required to give notice and
hold hearings, and to make the same reports and recommendations as
they would be required to make if the proposal were before them. This
process would not only make information available to the public but
would also provide a forum for discussion of the issues. Probably only
those most interested would attend. But, because the interested seg-
ment of the electorate may often control the election outcome,217 the
impact would be greater than the level of attendance would indicate.
218
Also, a summary of the information produced and arguments raised in
these hearings and reports should be included in a published argument
or recommendation of the legislative body.219
A final recommendation is that landowners whose land is zoned in
213. AssociatedHome Builders, 18 Cal. 3d at 594, 557 P.2d at 479, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 47.
See supra notes 114-18 & accompanying text.
214. See 18 Cal. 3d at 595, 557 P.2d at 480, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 48 ("mhe notice and
hearing provisions of the state zoning law, if interpreted to bar initiative land use ordi-
nances, would be of doubtful constitutionality.").
215. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 4015 (West Supp. 1982).
216. Public hearings would be held by both the planning commission and the local legis-
lative body. Furthermore, the planning commission would make written recommendations
on the proposal. See supra notes 30-34 & accompanying text. If the proposal would have a
significant impact on the environment, the local agency would have to prepare an environ-
mental impact report. See CAL. Pun. REs. CODE § 21080 (West Supp. 1982).
217. The initiative that rezoned Arnels land passed with the support of only 12% of
Costa Mesa's registered voters. See supra notes 155-56 & 161. In an election on a proposed
ordinance that would have much broader impact-the moratorium on building permits in
Livermore--only 36% of the registered voters voted, and the initiative was approved by 55%
of those voters. Associated Home Builders, 18 Cal. 3d at 615 n.4, 557 P.2d at 492 n.4, 135
Cal. Rptr. at 60 n.4 (Clark, J., dissenting).
218. It is not entirely unrealistic to suggest that the interested persons on either side of
the controversy might be persuaded to the other side. Apparently, the original proponents
of the initiative that rezoned Arnel's land were in agreement with the developer before the
election but were unable to remove the measure from the ballot. See Note, supra note 12, at
1108 n.9.
219. In addition to being informative, the hearings and reports will give a reviewing
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an arbitrary or discriminatory manner should not have to bear the en-
tire burden of challenging the ordinance. There should be a provision
for awarding attorney's fees when a landowner prevails in a suit chal-
lenging a zoning ordinance. 220 Because there is a strong presumption
in favor of the validity of legislation, a landowner will prevail only in
cases of outrageous zoning. A provision awarding attorney's fees
would not only protect private property interests from arbitrary zoning;
it would also promote both the integrity of land use regulation and the
general welfare by encouraging private parties to challenge zoning
which has no reasonable relation to the general welfare.
22'
Conclusion
California's land use regulatory system is structured to implement
general rules and policies to govern land use while allowing reasonable
exceptions in cases of unique hardship and accommodating individual
requests where doing so would promote the general welfare. The gen-
eral rules are promulgated through the enactment and amendment of
zoning ordinances, primarily with reference to the comprehensive plan.
Specific exceptions and permits are dispensed through administrative
proceedings, primarily with reference to the facts of the individual
situation.
The California Supreme Court has recognized that when the gov-
ernment addresses itself administratively to an individual situation and
decides which property rights are attached to a particular parcel of
land, it must satisfy the due process rights of all persons whose property
interests may be substantially affected by the decision. Therefore,
when the government considers an application for a variance or other
permit, it must give constitutionally sufficient notice and hearing to af-
fected parties, and it must support its decision with findings supported
by substantial evidence. On the other hand, when the government leg-
court a clearer sense of the issues and motives behind a zoning election and an evidentiary
basis for deciding whether the ordinance is discriminatory.
220. In those cases in which an ordinance is struck because it is not in the regional
welfare, the landowner will have bestowed a benefit on the general public, so the award of
attorney's fees may be appropriate under California's statutory provision for the award of
attorney's fees to "private attorneys general." See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1021.5 (West
1980); see also Horn v. County of Ventura, 24 Cal. 3d 605, 620, 596 P.2d 1134, 1142, 156 Cal.
Rptr. 718, 726 (1979).
221. For example, theArnel suit eventually succeeded in invalidating an ordinance that
was intended "to stop the development of apartments in the Arel project notwithstanding
the acute shortage of moderate income housing in the city." Arnel, 126 Cal. App. 3d at 335,
178 Cal. Rptr. at 726 (on remand). The proponents of that initiative stated in their ballot
argument that "[s]ingle family homes would have a greater positive effect upon the fair
market value of homes in the immediate area." Id at 336 n.5, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 726 n.5. See
supra note 196.
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islates, it is free of due process constraints, and its decisions are pre-
sumed to be valid.
Sometimes the legislative machinery of land use regulation is used
to determine the rights of a particular landowner or as to a particular
parcel of land. The impact of this legislative decision on the landowner
and neighbors may be the same as if the determination had been made
through administrative proceedings. Because the determination is ef-
fected through a zoning ordinance amendment, however, it is techni-
cally a legislative decision.
In Arnel Development Co. v. City of Costa Mesa, the California
Supreme Court refused to look past the means of governmental actions
to consider the object of those actions. Therefore, governmental ac-
tions that are cast in a legislative form are deemed to be legislative
decisions, even if their object and effect is to determine the property
rights of a small group of politically weak people. Parties whose prop-
erty interests are substantially affected by small-scale rezonings are left
with no constitutional right to notice or a hearing before the decision is
made, and are faced with a strong presumption of validity of the rezon-
ing if they challenge the decision in court.
The state legislature should provide statutory protection to these
landowners. First, there should be a requirement that regulatory modi-
fications be effected through administrative means whenever possible.
Second, when a local legislature does make a decision through legisla-
tive means, it should be required to support that decision with findings.
Third, when the electorate legislates directly, the local legislative body
should not passively await the decision. The local legislators should
hold hearings and disseminate information in order to encourage in-
formed decisionmaking by the electorate. Finally, a landowner or
neighbors who are victims of arbitrary or discriminatory land use legis-
lation should have a right to attorney's fees when they successfully
challenge the legislation.
Although the concept of democratic control of the use of land is
attractive, this power can be used to deprive a small minority of their
property interests without due process of law. In the absence of a judi-
cial willingness to address the problem of small-scale rezoning, a legis-
lative response is in order.
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